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OVERLOOKED AND UNDERUSED: CLINICAL PRACTICE 
GUIDELINES AND MALPRACTICE LIABILITY FOR 
INDEPENDENT PHYSICIANS 
 
RONEN AVRAHAM, SJD* 
 
*** 
 
This paper discusses how the use of Clinical Practice Guidelines (CPGs) 
can improve the quality and delivery of healthcare in America.  The author 
states that with the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act of 2010 the American healthcare system is in need of re-alignment, 
specifically challenging the established norms for promulgating 
CPGs.  The article explores the legal evolution of CPGs and new legal 
avenues for their promulgation by examining their history and 
purpose.  The author concludes by identifying three accountability models 
and arguing in favor of a private competitive regime for CPGs.  
 
*** 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
American medical care is plagued by overuse, underuse, and 
misuse.1 Overconsumption of medical care is one of the main contributors 
towards rising health care costs in the United States.  A recent Institute of 
Medicine report estimates that unnecessary services cost $210 billion each 
year.2 However, even though Americans consume an enormous amount of 
health care, they only receive optimal care – or the care that is 
                                                                                                                 
* Thomas Shelton Maxey Professor of Law, University of Texas School of 
Law; Professor of Law, Tel Aviv University. I thank Bill Sage for help with prior 
drafts. All remaining errors are mine. 
1 Elise C. Becher & Mark Chassin, Improving the Quality of Health Care: 
Who Will Lead?, 20 HEALTH AFF. 164, 165–66 (2001) (defining quality problems 
as underuse, overuse, and misuse); Ronen Avraham, Private Regulation, 34 HARV. 
J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 543, 548–49 (2011) (discussing same) [hereinafter Avraham, 
Private Regulation]. Other papers refer to these concepts as defensive medicine, 
offensive medicine, and medical errors. E.g., Ronen Avraham, Clinical Practice 
Guidelines: The Warped Incentives in the U.S. Health Care System, 37 AM. J. L. & 
MED. 7, 9 (2011) [hereinafter Avraham, Warped Incentives]. 
2 INST. OF MED., BEST CARE AT LOWER COST: THE PATH TO CONTINUOUSLY 
LEARNING HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA, 3-10 (Mark Smith et al. eds., 2012). 
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recommended by the best available information – 54% of the time. 3 
President Obama recognized the danger of this mounting issue when, 
during the 2013 State of the Union, he identified rising health care costs as 
the biggest driver of long-term debt. 4  The million, or trillion, dollar 
question is how to reduce costs while simultaneously improving quality.  
This article explores an answer to that question. 
Following the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act of 2010 (PPACA), it has become clear that there needs to be a 
major realignment of incentives for the various players in the health care 
system, and this cannot occur without significant shifts in payment, the 
structure of care delivery, and accountability for quality and safety.  
PPACA contemplates, for example, bundled payment for inpatient acute 
care that combines revenue streams for hospitals and for physicians, 
episodic payment for periods of illness or complete courses of treatment, 
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) that are held to transparent 
standards for performance and bear financial risk for utilization of services, 
and patient-centered medical homes that offer comprehensive primary care 
services.  With different models for payment, transparency, and 
organizational affiliation, the hope is that hospitals and other large practices 
will have incentives to develop or adopt protocols for optimal delivery of 
care even if medical liability laws are unchanged.   
 Because of these and other developments, physicians have been 
leaving solo and small-group practice for employment in larger practices 
and hospitals.5 Notwithstanding these trends, American health care will 
remain more fragmented than someone unversed in history would predict 
given the complexity, capital requirements, and interdisciplinary nature of 
diagnosing and treating serious illnesses.  Many physicians will continue to 
practice medicine in small settings,6 and other health professionals, such as 
                                                                                                                 
3 INS. OF MED., CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES WE CAN TRUST 146 (Robin 
Graham et al. eds., 2011) [hereinafter 2011 IOM Report]. 
4  FOX NEWS (Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/02/12/ 
transcript-obama-state-union-speech/ 
5  See Mark Hagland, One-Third of U.S. Physicians Plan to Quit Private 
Practice Within 10 Years, HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS (Aug. 8, 2012), 
http://www.healthcare-informatics.com/news-item/one-third-us-physicians-plan-
quit-private-practice-within-10-years. 
6  APA Executive Director Keynote Address to 2011 State Leadership 
Conference (Mar. 31, 2011) (“Eighty nine percent of all physicians work in solo 
practice or small group practices of 10 or fewer physicians.”), available at 
http://www.apapracticecentral.org/update/2011/03-31/evolving-health.aspx. 
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advanced practice nurses, are likely to secure legal privileges for 
independent practice as well.   
 This paper focuses on physicians in small practice settings and on 
norms rather than incentives as a way to improve the delivery of care.  
Incentives – sticks and carrots – dominate most discussions, particularly 
bonuses and penalties associated with reimbursement schemes.  The 
problem is that these measures often provide only weak incentives to avoid 
errors but strong incentives to both over- and under-treat patients.  In this 
paper, I explore a more direct way to influence how practitioners deliver 
care: clinical practice guidelines (CPGs).   
CPGs are written statements of the best clinical practices to be 
applied to patient care based on the professional judgment of a given group 
of medical professionals who review the scientific evidence and assess the 
benefits and harms of alternative care options.  CPGs can be promulgated 
by public or private organizations, such as specialty societies, advocacy 
groups, state agencies, health plans, commercial entities, and in the future, 
perhaps even by computers.  Even IBM’s supercomputer Watson is 
reportedly getting into the field of medical advice.7 There are over 2,700 
CPGs in a U.S government run depository called the National Guideline 
Clearinghouse – promulgated by more than 350 groups.8  
The history of CPGs in the United States is intertwined with 
medical malpractice liability.  This is particularly true for physicians in 
solo or small-group practice.  As small businesspeople, these physicians 
tend to be very sensitive to the potential economic and reputational harm 
that allegations of malpractice can cause, and often feel very personally and 
intensely the uncertainty associated with litigation.  As described in more 
detail below, early experiments with CPGs were designed to assuage 
physicians’ fears of meritless suits and tendencies toward self-protection 
through costly defensive medicine.  These malpractice-oriented CPGs were 
often the first to be debated in legislatures and tested by the courts. 
However, treating CPGs as relevant primarily for litigation purposes is why 
CPGs are overlooked and underused, as the title of this paper suggests.  
The potential for cost reduction and quality improvement from CPGs is 
much greater than malpractice reform alone could induce.  
                                                                                                                 
7  NEWSER (Feb. 8, 2013, 6:09 PM), http://www.newser.com/story/162517/ 
ibms-watson-to-start-dispensing-medical-advice.html. 
8  NATIONAL GUIDELINE CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.guideline.gov/browse/ 
by-topic.aspx (last visited Feb. 12, 2014).  
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CPGs have the potential to reduce the prevalence of unnecessary, 
and often incorrect, medical procedures in fragmented environments 
because their focus is directly on the proper way to deliver care, rather than 
on providing incentives (sticks and carrots) for the providers to find the 
proper care themselves.  As a doctor, especially as a solo practitioner, it is 
impossible to keep up with current medical research.  So many studies are 
published each year that a cardiologist would have to read 10 articles per 
day, 365 days a year, to stay current.9 Not only is this impossible, but it is a 
waste of the doctor’s time.  As science continues to build on itself, the 
number of studies increases exponentially, and no one person can be 
expected to synthesize and master it all.10 Advances in technology will 
contribute as well.  Today’s young doctors use smart phones, tablets, and 
laptops on the job.  This allows CPGs to be readily available, easily 
accessible, and instantaneously updated when new information is 
developed. 
Although the concept of medical best practices may seem 
uncontroversial, there are substantial challenges involved in achieving 
compliance by practicing physicians.  In 2012, for example, the U.S. 
Preventive Services Task Force released a new recommendation against 
PSA-based screening for prostate cancer.11 The recommendation advised 
doctors to stop testing for Prostate-Specific Antigen because of its high 
false-positive rate for adenocarcinoma (80%), complications arising from 
follow-up biopsies, and its limited ability to change health outcomes from 
diagnosed cancers.12 A survey fielded after the recommendation was issued 
found that 49% of physicians agreed with its reasoning, but surprisingly, 
only 1.8% actually planned to stop using the test. 13  Some doctors felt 
                                                                                                                 
9 IAN AYRES, SUPER CRUNCHERS: WHY THINKING-BY-NUMBERS IS 
THE NEW WAY TO BE SMART 92 (2007). 
10 Justin Kung et al., Failure of Clinical Practice Guidelines to Meet Institute 
of Medicine Standards, 172 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 1628, 1628 (2012) 
(describing a “dizzying array” of CPGs that expands year after year). 
11  U.S. PREVENTIVE SERVICES TASK FORCE, SCREENING FOR PROSTATE 
CANCER: CURRENT RECOMMENDATION (May 2012), http://www.uspreventive 
servicestaskforce.org/prostatecancerscreening.htm. 
12 Sarah Kliff, Many Doctors Think PSA Tests Don’t Work. But They’ll Keep 
Doing Them Anyway, WASH. POST, May 29, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/many-doctors-think-psa-tests-dont-work-but-theyllkeep-
doing-them-anyway/2012/05/29/gJQAOl0qyU_blog.html. 
13 Id. 
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patients expected to receive the test,14 others did not think they had time to 
explain the changes to their patients, and still others worried that patients 
would feel their health care was being rationed.15 Indeed, even doctors who 
wish to rely on CPGs are faced with numerous challenges because of how 
CPGs are currently created and regulated.  Authors often have conflicts of 
interest that may or may not be disclosed, guidelines are created that 
recommend conflicting treatments, and there is no system in place to 
ensure that CPGs are updated or that outdated recommendations are 
removed from circulation.16 
The importance of guaranteeing the trustworthiness of CPGs has 
not escaped Congress. Through the Medicare Improvements for Patients 
and Providers Act of 2008, Congress called on the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) to contract with the Institute of Medicine (IOM),17 
through the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ),18 to 
undertake a study that focuses on how to make CPGs trustworthy.  In 
March 2011 the IOM issued its report, which was entitled “Clinical 
                                                                                                                 
14 Id. 
15 Id. Guidelines for dealing with prostate cancer are just one example. Many 
more examples exist. For example, a recent study by pediatricians from the Cohen 
Children's Medical Center of New York that more than 90 percent of medical 
specialists who diagnose and manage ADHD in preschoolers do not follow 
treatment guidelines. See SCIENCE DAILY (May 4, 2013), http://www.science 
daily.com/releases/2013/05/130504163310.htm. 
16 See infra Part II(B). 
17 “The Institute of Medicine (IOM) is an independent, nonprofit organization 
that works outside of government to provide unbiased and authoritative advice to 
decision makers and the public. Established in 1970, the IOM is the health arm of 
the National Academy of Sciences, which was chartered under President Abraham 
Lincoln in 1863. Nearly 150 years later, the National Academy of Sciences has 
expanded into what is collectively known as the National Academies, which 
comprises the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of 
Engineering, the National Research Council, and the IOM.” See About the IOM, 
INS. OF MED., www.iom.edu/About-IOM.aspx (last visited Feb. 12, 2014). 
18 “The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality's (AHRQ) mission is to 
produce evidence to make health care safer, higher quality, more accessible, 
equitable, and affordable, and to work with the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) and other partners to make sure that the evidence is 
understood and used.” See AHRQ Profile, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH 
AND QUALITY, http://www.ahrq.gov/about/mission/glance/profile.html (last visited 
Feb. 12, 2014). 
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Practice Guidelines We Can Trust.” 19  The IOM made eight 
recommendations (or standards) regarding various issues related to the 
optimal development of CPGs. 20  These issues, such as transparency, 
conflict of interest, external review, and updating are indeed crucial for 
ensuring trustworthy CPGs. Importantly, the IOM called on the Secretary 
of HHS to “establish a public–private mechanism to examine, at the request 
of developer organizations, the procedures they use to produce their clinical 
practice guidelines and to certify whether these organizations’ CPG 
development procedures comply with [eight] standards for trustworthy 
CPGs.”  In other words, the IOM’s proposed model is one where a public–
private entity issues a seal of approval that the procedures taken by 
guidelines developers fit the standards.  
As this article argues, this is not the only possible model for 
optimal promulgation of CPGs.  
In this article, I examine various legal models for creating and 
disseminating CPGs in light of the PPACA and other aspects of the new 
health care environment, focusing on uses by independent physicians rather 
than large health care organizations.  In the course of analysis, I update 
research from almost two decades ago regarding how courts view and 
apply CPGs, primarily in malpractice litigation.  I also critique the recent 
endorsements by the IOM and the AHRQ of a model of public–private 
certification of CPG promulgators.  Recent articles by physicians “on the 
ground” have similarly found the IOM’s method for ensuring CPG 
reliability problematic.21  
                                                                                                                 
19  INS. OF MED., CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES WE CAN TRUST, (Robin 
Graham et al. eds., 2011), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php? 
record_id=13058 (last visited Feb. 12, 2014). 
20 These standards include: 1) transparency, 2) management of conflicts of 
interest, 3) the composition of guideline development groups, 4) the intersection of 
CPGs and systematic review of technology, 5) evidence foundations for guidelines 
and rating the strength of recommendations, 6) articulation of recommendations, 7) 
external review of developed guidelines, and 8) updating guidelines. Id. at 78-139. 
21 For example, a recent publication by the American Medical Association 
found that conflicts of interest were present for 91% of the committee co-
chairpersons of guideline producers. Justin Kung et al., Failure of Clinical 
Practice Guidelines to Meet Institute of Medicine Standards, 172 ARCHIVES OF 
INTERNAL MED. 1628, 1628 (2012). This same study found conflicts of interest 
present in 71% of chairpersons. Id. In other words, despite IOM standards that 
called for transparency and the removal of conflicts from guidelines, little has 
actually changed. Another article reported that the IOM standards are impractical 
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The IOM’s approach asserts that CPGs on any given topic should 
be unbiased, expert, and convergent if not fully unitary (definitive).  I 
suggest that these conditions often cannot be met.  I advocate for a more 
thorough review of options, including those that accept bias as inevitable 
and that tolerate more diversity among CPGs.  One example, particularly 
suited to use by independent physicians, is a market-based system that 
would hold private CPG creators liable for their outcomes, rather than only 
their process of guideline development and promulgation.  CPGs produced 
in this market would be accurate and trustworthy because of accountability 
as well as transparency.  
Consider, for example, conflict of interest.  The IOM Report 
ultimately recognizes the myth of neutrality surrounding current CPGs, and 
acknowledges that CPG authors inevitably bring their personal and 
professional biases to the table.  Funding of CPGs by interested parties 
such as medical device makers or pharmaceutical companies can also be 
problematic because of pressure to recommend the funder’s products.  
Pharmaceutical companies stopped funding the creation of CPGs in 2010, 
but still pay for their distribution and updating.22  The IOM Report attempts 
to address conflict of interest using procedural rules, such as requiring that 
the chair of the guidelines development group will have no conflict of 
interest, and that members of the group divest themselves of relevant 
financial investments.  I propose that in many circumstances a different 
approach should be considered.  If one cannot beat market forces, one 
might be better served by harnessing them to the process of creating 
CPGs.23 In other words, a structured marketplace for guidelines may be 
optimal under certain circumstances.  
In Part II, I describe the history of CPGs and explain their 
purposes.  I focus on the connection between CPGs and specific attributes 
of the U.S. health care system.  I evaluate the relative strengths of 
government, self-regulatory organizations, and the private sector in 
producing guidelines.  I then outline a conceptual framework for 
understanding and evaluating possible accountability and governance 
mechanisms for the legal oversight of CPGs.  
                                                                                                                 
because 0 of 114 randomly selected CPGs met the IOM’s definition of trustworthy. 
David F. Ransohoff et al., How to Decide Whether a Clinical Practice Guideline is 
Trustworthy, 309 JAMA 139, 139–40 (2013). 
22 Avraham, Warped Incentives, supra note 1, at 29. 
23 See infra, Part IV(C). 
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Part III presents an empirical study of cases from the last decade 
and shows how courts regard CPGs as a practical matter.  In this part, I also 
review more comprehensive government initiatives involving guidelines.  
Part IV identifies and analyzes three accountability models for 
CPGs that have attracted attention from commentators and policymakers.   
Early guideline projects contemplated the direct development and issuance 
of CPGs by government.  By contrast, recent reports on CPGs issued by the 
IOM and the AHRQ endorse a model of legal governance based on 
government certification of acceptable guidelines promulgated by various 
parties.24 I argue that exclusive reliance on public models is misplaced, and 
other alternatives, including private competitive regimes, should be 
considered as well.25 I conclude by identifying ways in which a private 
competitive regime for CPGs might develop in the market for physician 
services. 
 
II. OVERVIEW OF CPGS 
 
A. WHAT ARE CPGS AND WHERE DID THEY COME FROM? 
 
 Ideally, a clinical practice guideline is a clear, succinct statement of 
optimal medical care based on current professional knowledge.  It should 
provide an individual practitioner with the information needed to make a 
fully informed decision consistent with scientific evidence of treatment 
effectiveness.  It should also be updated regularly as new information about 
medical best practices becomes known.  
CPGs have existed for the last fifty years but were little known 
until the 1980s, when the number of guidelines being disseminated 
increased dramatically. Guidelines began to be produced by a variety of 
organizations, including professional societies, hospitals, professional 
review boards, and state health departments.  The federal government 
                                                                                                                 
24 Rosoff proposes a system that would use the federal government not to 
develop guidelines, but to certify privately developed CPGs. See Arnold J. Rosoff, 
The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Health Care Reform, 5 HEALTH 
MATRIX 369, 395 (1995). 
25  Under Avraham’s model, called the Private Regulation Regime (PRR), 
private firms would develop and continually update medical practice guidelines, 
and they would compete to license their own CPGs to medical providers. 
Additionally, the private firms would be held liable for putting forth sub-optimal 
guidelines. Avraham, Private Regulation, supra note 1, at 591. 
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became involved as well, most notably through the Agency for Health Care 
Policy and Research (AHCPR), a small branch of the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services that spearheaded the development of roughly 
twenty different guidelines across key clinical practice areas.26 
 The rise of CPGs is relatively easy to explain.  Beginning in the 
1970s, studies by John Wennberg and his colleagues revealed substantial 
differences in clinical practice patterns from state to state and even from 
town to town that were not correlated with the severity of illness or the 
clinical outcome of each case. 27  These “small-area variation” studies 
quickly generated concerns about both excessive spending and suboptimal 
care quality.  These concerns were compounded by research revealing that 
even published results of randomized clinical trials – the gold standard for 
scientific evidence – changed the delivery of care in the community very 
slowly, if at all.  John Eisenberg, the first administrator of the Agency for 
Health care Research and Quality (AHRQ), suggested the root cause of this 
phenomenon was physician reluctance to incorporate new scientific 
evidence into practice.28 The logical solution was the practice guideline. 
 The conditions that make guidelines an appealing health policy tool 
have developed over the course of several decades.  Four assumptions 
plausibly comprise the foundation for guideline-based policy responses to 
clinical variation.  These attributes of the U.S. health care system are 
normatively contestable and subject to various economic and social 
pressures.  Even those that perhaps should change, however, will not 
change quickly.  
                                                                                                                 
26  This initiative attracted political opposition and the agency no longer 
performs this role.  Eleanor M. Perfetto & Lisa Stockwell Morris, Agency for 
Health Care Policy & Research Clinical Practice Guidelines, 30 ANNALS OF 
PHARMACOTHERAPY 1117 (1996). 
27  See generally John E. Wennberg, Dealing with Medical Practice 
Variations: A Proposal for Action, HEALTH AFFAIRS, May 1984 at 6.  For 
example, a study published in the early 1980s described how in Maine, the 
likelihood of a woman’s having a hysterectomy by the time she reached age 70 
varied from 20 to 70 percent in different hospital markets. In Iowa, the likelihood 
that a man who reached the age of 85 would have had a prostatectomy varied from 
15 to 60 percent in different areas. In Vermont, children who had undergone a 
tonsillectomy varied from 8 to 70 percent depending on geographic area.  Id. at 9. 
28 John M. Eisenberg, Quality Research for Quality Health Care: The Data 
Connection, 35 HEALTH SERVS. RESEARCH xii (June 2000). 
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As such, it is assumed the following to be accurate characteristics 
of U.S. health care that are considered desirable by a substantial percentage 
of health care professionals and the public: 
 
1. Confidence in the physician as a legitimate source of 
clinical decisions affecting patients.  Respect for 
physicians as trained professionals, for example, 
conceptualizes CPGs as advisory rather than directive, 
rejects “cookbook medicine,” and accommodates patient 
variation and the exercise of medical judgment.  
 
2. Acceptance of solo and small-group practice models, with 
decentralized organization and fragmented care delivery, 
continuing to play an important role in the delivery of 
health care.  
 
3.  Belief that accurate, up-to-date, and useful information 
about medical practice is under-produced, that and 
supplying this information contributes a “public good” for 
physicians and the health care system.  
 
B.  PITFALLS AND PROMISES FOR CPGS 
  
1.  What is wrong with current CPGs? 
 
Scholars have been complaining for a long time about the quality 
of CPGs.29 One major issue is the unstructured oversight system now in 
                                                                                                                 
29 Researchers at the University of Maryland summed up the complaints as 
follows:  
 
Their concerns have focused on the quality of the evidence 
on which clinical practice guidelines are based, the tendency of 
guidelines to promote more care rather than more effective care, 
their narrow focus and use as marketing and opinion-based 
pieces rather than road maps to improved medical care, and the 
difficulties involved in customizing population-based 
recommendations to individual patients.  Also of concern has 
been the lack of transparency in the process by which clinical 
practice guidelines are created and potential conflicts (COIs) that 
might bias those preparing them. 
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place, which the IOM Report attempted to address.  Self-regulatory 
standards have existed for a decade.  The Appraisal of Guidelines, 
Research and Evaluation (AGREE) was published in 2003, and since that 
time has become the most widely accepted standard for assessing the 
quality of the process of guideline development.30 The IOM report built on 
and improved AGREE by addressing questions such as the funding of 
guideline development and managing conflict of interest. 31  The IOM 
Report does not consider accountability for drafters of CPGs, or legal 
recourse for injuries attributable to incorrect guidelines, even though 
holding drafters accountable could help ensure that guidelines are properly 
drafted and regularly updated.  
A recent University of Maryland study of 130 clinical practice 
guidelines found that many do not meet IOM standards.32 Fewer than half 
of the guidelines listed conflicts of interest, many did not offer differing 
committee member views, and few committees included an information 
scientist, a patient, or a patient representative.33 It is often difficult to know 
what methods a drafter used in writing the guidelines or whether there are 
conflicts of interest of which potential users should be aware. 34  As 
mentioned above, the approach taken in this paper is that instead of 
accepting the myth of neutrality of current CPGs and assuming there are 
minimal conflicts of interests, the default view should be the opposite: 
CPGs are likely to be riddled with conflicts of interest. 
 Even if guidelines were perfect, physicians face information 
overload when they are willing to use guidelines.  Although the number of 
guidelines is far less than the number of new research studies involving 
                                                                                                                 
Kung et al., supra note 21, at 1628–29. 
30 See generally The AGREE Collaboration, Development and Validation of 
an International Appraisal Instrument for Assessing the Quality of Clinical 
Practice Guidelines: The AGREE Project, 12 QUAL SAFETY HEALTH CARE 
18 (Feb. 2003). 
31 The IOM Report improved on other frontiers as well. It developed standards 
for the updating of guidelines, external review and public comment and requiring a 
systematic review of the literature as a necessary stage in the development. See 
David F. Ransohoff et al., How to Decide Whether a Clinical Practice Guideline is 
Trustworthy, 309 JAMA 139, 139 (2013). 
32 Kung et al., supra note 21, at 1629–30. 
33 Id. 
34 See 2011 IOM Report, supra note 3, at 2. 
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medical care,35 the National Guideline Clearinghouse (NGC), a database of 
CPGs in the United States, currently indexes over 2,700 guidelines.36 In 
2008 alone, the NGC added 722 new CPGs.37    
Alas, many CPGs are not user-friendly.  Guidelines are often long 
and dense.38 Even with the large amount of information they provide, they 
still may not offer clear instructions for doctors attempting to apply them to 
a specific patient.39  
Moreover, it remains unclear which CPGs are still authoritative.  
Optimal medical procedures change over time.  It is often difficult to 
determine when the weight of evidence has caused a justifiable shift against 
a certain treatment that should result in a change to the relevant CPGs.  On 
average, CPGs cost at least $200,000 to produce and substantial amounts to 
revise.40 Many of the parties that can most easily afford these sums, such as 
pharmaceutical companies,41 are particularly prone to conflicts of interest.   
There is also the semi-myth of uniformity.  Guidelines do not 
always agree even when they cover the same medical conditions or 
procedures.  This may partly result from varying incentives for each 
producer.  For example, a guideline created by a managed care plan may be 
more concerned with cost implications of treatment recommendations than 
a guideline created by a physician specialty society.  To be clear, different 
guidelines based on patients’ willingness to pay for procedures could make 
sense, like economy, business, and first-class airline seating.  But there 
must be a good reason for the different treatment.  If the reason for 
conflicting guidelines is just that the authors came to conflicting 
recommendations about the best treatment (regardless of costs) then that is 
an issue.  In that case both guidelines cannot both be correct.  
In many situations, available evidence regarding best practices is 
scarce.  While some would argue that this means no recommendation 
should be made, others argue that doctors need CPGs even more in these 
                                                                                                                 
35 From 1994 to 2001, there were around 25,000 randomized controlled trials 
published on MEDLINE, a medical literature database. Id. at 1. No organization, 
let alone a single doctor, is able to review 70 studies per day, evaluate their 
credibility, and apply their findings to their practice. 
36 Id. at 2. 
37 Id. 
38 See id. at 146. 
39 See id. 
40 See id. at 62 (internal citation omitted). 
41 See Avraham, Warped Incentives, supra note 1, at 29 and accompanying 
text. 
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instances.42 Without a consistent rating scale that indicates the level of 
support for a particular guideline, however, it can be difficult to determine 
which guidelines are the most reliable.43 A study by Grilli and others found 
that 82% of guidelines studied did not expressly state the strength of their 
recommendation.44 
The IOM Report recognizes that “[n]on-standardized development 
results in substantial troubling variation in clinical recommendations.”45 
However, the IOM Report does not attempt to eliminate this problem but 
only predicts that, with increased oversight and stricter CPG production 
procedures, the problems of inconsistent recommendations can be 
reduced.46 In doing so the IOM Report seems to waive its hands in an 
attempt to address the semi-myth of uniformity with respect to current 
CPGs. 
 
2.  What is the Potential of CPGs? 
 
Legal commentators often focus on CPGs in connection with 
medical malpractice reform.47 In fact, CPGs’ benefits can be divided into 
three major categories: improving the quality of care and reducing errors, 
decreasing defensive medicine, and decreasing offensive medicine 
(overtreatment). 
 
a.  CPGs Can Improve Quality 
 
 First and foremost, CPGs should assure and improve the quality of 
medical care.  The standard for measuring quality used in health policy, 
articulated by Donabedian in the 1960s, distinguishes interpersonal aspects 
of quality, such as compassion, from technical aspects of quality, such as 
surgical precision.  It further divides technical aspects into three categories: 
structure (e.g., the number of nurses per hospital ward), processes (e.g., 
whether patients with bacterial infections receive antibiotics), and 
                                                                                                                 
42 See 2011 IOM Report, supra note 3, at 63. 
43 See id. 
44 Id. at 64 (internal citation omitted) (reviewing 431 guidelines developed by 
specialty societies between 1988 and 1998). This study also concluded that CPGs 
were making moderate progress over time. Id. 
45 Id. at 65–66 (internal citations omitted). 
46 Id. at 198–99. 
47 See infra notes 93–128. 
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outcomes (e.g., percentage of cancer patients who survive for five years 
after treatment).  
 Few will disagree that the best way to improve health care is to 
evaluate outcomes such as cures, survival rates, and symptom relief.  These 
outcome measures represent the third prong of the Donabedian definition 
of quality, and they are the preferred approach of proponents of new 
incentive systems for health care providers, such as pay-for-performance 
systems (P4P), and of systems that rely on transparency to motivate 
improvement, such as public “report cards” for hospitals and HMOs.  There 
are various problems with evaluating outcomes.  The most relevant here is 
that measuring outcomes in a statistically reliable manner requires large 
datasets.  Individual physicians cannot reasonably be held accountable for 
clinical outcomes because of their small patient populations.48  
What is, then, the role of CPGs in improving care? CPGs are 
primarily designed to define (technical) processes.49 Though this may seem 
obvious, it establishes the limitations of CPGs and distinguishes them from 
other instruments that can be governed separately.  Thus, interpersonal 
aspects of quality are monitored, if at all, through an uneasy balance 
between professional codes of ethics and consumer preferences.  CPGs do 
not attempt to address these dimensions of medical performance.  
Similarly, structural features of care, especially those involving large 
capital investments, often remain absent from CPGs because they are not 
viewed as within the control of individual physicians, who are the principal 
audience for guidelines.50 Governance mechanisms for structural features 
                                                                                                                 
48 See, e.g., Arnold Milstein & Thomas H. Lee, Comparing Physicians on 
Efficiency, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2649 (2007) (discussing the pitfalls and 
challenges facing solo and small practitioners). 
49  See generally AVEDIS DONABEDIAN, THE DEFINITION OF QUALITY AND 
APPROACHES TO ASSESSMENT: EXPLORATIONS IN QUALITY ASSESSMENT AND 
MONITORING (Health Admin. Press 1980); Avedis Donabedian, Evaluating the 
Quality of Medical Care, 44 MILBANK MEM’L FUND Q. 166 (1966).   
50 Technology assessment has also been outside the mainstream of practice 
guidelines. To gain greater political acceptance, technology assessment will 
probably need to incorporate professional standards and work in tandem with 
practice guidelines because the public looks to physicians as experts on inventing 
and evaluating new clinical technology as well as on deploying it. Efforts are 
ongoing to integrate technology assessment with specific clinical 
recommendations. Notably, Congress recently chartered a new comparative 
effectiveness institute in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act and the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, but it placed significant legal 
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tend to be mandatory, implemented via compliance with regulatory or 
accreditation standards, and are usually applied to institutions as opposed to 
professionals.51  
 Moreover, guidelines are increasingly intertwined with health 
information technology such as electronic health records with 
computerized decision support.  Proponents of CPGs have generally 
assumed that users can easily recognize a functional guideline and 
therefore that using it would reflect a conscious decision to access a 
discrete set of recommendations. Indeed, existing technology, including 
tablets, smart phones, and other handheld devices with internet 
connectivity, makes reference information and decision support readily 
available to individuals performing both clinical and administrative 
functions.52 Some of these resources can be accessed on demand by users 
seeking guidance, but others are seamlessly incorporated into medical 
information systems.  Emerging technologies are likely to embed 
algorithms directly into the equipment, facilities, and systems that are used 
to deliver and manage care.  Individual users may even be unaware that a 
guideline is being followed. 
  
 
 
                                                                                                                 
restrictions on how findings of relative ineffectiveness can be used. See Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 3011, 3501, 6302 
(2010). 
51  Examples are the conditions of participation that Medicare regulation 
imposes on health care facilities, and the accreditation standards for hospitals 
promulgated by the Joint Commission. The Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) issued an amended guideline on December 30, 2009 for 
ambulatory surgical centers. See generally DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. 
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., PUB. 100-07, REVISED APPENDIX L: 
INTERPRETIVE GUIDELINES FOR AMBULATORY SURGICAL CENTERS (2009), 
available at http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Transmit 
tals/downloads/r56soma.pdf. 
52 These technologies are already in use by doctors. See, e.g., Anne Eisenberg, 
Those Scan Results Are Just an App Away, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2012, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/16/business/medical-apps-to-assist-with-diagnos 
es-cleared-by-fda.html (discussing one doctor’s use of the Mobile MIM app, which 
allows his iPhone or iPad to act as a diagnostic medical instrument). 
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b. Clear Standards of Care Can Decrease Defensive 
Medicine and Improve Safety 
 
 Fear of malpractice liability has long been regarded as a major 
cause of physicians’ clinical idiosyncrasies, and therefore, it seems an 
obvious area where CPGs should be applied.  In the 1960s, the number of 
malpractice claims and the cost of physicians’ malpractice insurance 
premiums began to rise rapidly.  Some commentators attributed this rise to 
unscrupulous lawyers and corrupt expert witnesses who persuaded 
sympathetic juries to impose a higher “standard of care” on physicians than 
was required by the law or indicated by medical science.53 Moreover, this 
trend seemed to be self-reinforcing, as customary practice was defined 
upwards by the courts, creating a vicious circle of defensive medicine, 
waste, and litigation. 
 The first CPGs offered a potential liability shield against frivolous 
claims by countering adverse expert witness testimony.  Using national 
standards rather than customary practice in specific localities to define the 
standard of care seemed like a logical step to address the issue of 
unnecessary and potentially dangerous variation in quality across disparate 
medical practices.54 Early guideline proponents hoped judges and juries 
would accept CPGs to define the standard of care in individual lawsuits and 
that states would eventually amend their laws to make compliance with 
CPGs a formal defense to liability.  When the standard of care is clearly 
defined, there is no incentive to run unneeded tests or provide treatments 
solely for fear of future litigation. 
 It took several more years for policymakers and medical 
professionals to acknowledge that rates of medical error were unacceptably 
high,55 and that, because of the expense and unpredictability of malpractice 
                                                                                                                 
53 See, e.g., Louis J. Regan, Medicine and the Law, 250 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 
463 (1954) (blaming malpractice suits on unscrupulous lawyers and physician 
turncoats rather than poor care).   
54 Over time, the localism of malpractice law has faded both with respect to 
the “locality rule” for standard practice and in terms of evaluating care based on 
whether it was reasonable rather than merely customary. See generally E. Lee 
Schlender, Malpractice and the Idaho Locality Rule: Stuck in the Nineteenth 
Century, 44 IDAHO L. REV. 361 (2008); Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of 
Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at The Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 163 (2000). 
55 There are estimates that medical errors still cause almost 100,000 deaths 
each year. Indeed, about 1 in 50 people who enter a medical facility will suffer an 
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litigation, few of these avoidable injuries were being compensated by the 
courts. 56  Revelations of rampant medical error in the late 1990s made 
avoiding misuse of tests and treatments a further goal of guideline 
compliance.  The problems of medical error and defensive medicine are 
interrelated, as both often stem from the lack of a clear guidepost against 
which to measure physician performance.  From this perspective, CPGs 
could also serve as a “liability sword,” identifying physicians who misused 
a given treatment.57 Predictably, the potential inculpatory application of 
CPGs in court was far less appealing to physicians than their use in a 
purely exculpatory role.   
  
c. Guidelines Can Combat Offensive Medicine and Reduce 
Wasteful Spending 
 
 The current fee-for-service payment system gives physicians a 
direct financial incentive to run additional tests and perform unnecessary 
procedures.  Combined with the easy availability of advanced clinical 
technologies (particularly in hospitals), the financial insulation of most 
insured patients from the cost of this care through health insurance, and 
physicians’ tendency to over-test to avoid potential malpractice suits, fee-
for-service payment is a major reason why the United States spends the 
most on health care but lags behind many developed nations in terms of 
health care quality.58  
 The FBI investigation of the Redding Medical Center in California 
highlights the dangers of offensive medicine.  At Redding, one thousand 
coronary artery bypass graft operations, a very profitable surgery, were 
performed each year, nearly three times the average rate for a facility of its 
                                                                                                                 
adverse event that could have been prevented, and most of this harm is due to 
negligence. Avraham, Private Regulation, supra note 1, at 548–49.   
56 See TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 22–44, 68–77 (2005); 
William M. Sage, New Directions in Medical Liability Reform, in MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE: A PHYSICIAN’S SOURCEBOOK 247–78 (Richard E. Anderson ed., 
2005). 
57 See generally Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of 
Clinical Practice Guidelines in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. PENN L. 
REV. 645 (2001). 
58 See Uwe E. Reinhardt et al., U.S. Health Care Spending in an International 
Context, 23 HEALTH AFF. 10, 10–12 (May/June 2004). 
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size.  The investigators alleged that a large portion were not medically 
justified, but were done to boost profits for the hospital and its physicians.59  
Although cost-effectiveness has rarely been an explicit element of 
CPGs, they can generate health care savings.  Discouraging overuse of 
medical care is the clearest but not the only connection between CPGs and 
health care costs.  Reducing misuse both improves safety and averts costly 
complications.  Even rooting out underuse can have desirable economic 
effects.  Many cost-effective tests supported by CPGs are overlooked and 
left unused by physicians lacking guidelines.  CPGs can also align pricing 
with care by having gold and platinum treatment levels for those who pay 
more.  Much like one can purchase more insurance to ensure coverage of 
more procedures, one could pay more to be in a higher CPG tier.      
 
3.  Who Might Produce and Regulate CPGs? 
 
Guidelines may be produced by public agencies, self-regulatory 
bodies, or private organizations.  As one might expect, the desired 
regulatory oversight scheme would differ significantly according to the 
guideline issuer’s identity.  Choosing among these alternatives should 
reflect serious thought about regulatory design.  Political feasibility is also 
important and should be prospectively considered.  
 
a. Government 
 
 One of the characteristics accepted in the introduction of this paper 
was the idea that CPGs are a public good.  With that in mind, one would 
think that the government should be responsible for their promulgation.  
Government promulgated guidelines are a more attractive policy 
option in countries where the government acts as a single health care payer 
because the government internalizes the cost of health care and, for that 
matter, the cost of medical liability.  In Britain, the National Institute for 
Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE), an independent organization 
closely linked to the British government, evaluates new technologies for 
coverage by the UK’s National Health Service (NHS), and considers both 
                                                                                                                 
59 See Kurt Eichenwald, Operating Profits: Mining Medicare, N.Y. TIMES, 
August 12, 2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/12/business/ 
operating-profits-mining-medicare-one-hospital-benefited-questionable-
surgery.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
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quality and cost.  NICE is thus well positioned to suggest best practices for 
NHS physicians.  
In the US, the federal government exerts considerable influence 
over the health care system by funding the Medicare and Medicaid 
programs, while state government plays a more direct regulatory role in 
addition to its Medicaid oversight function.  Payment policy offers a 
straightforward justification for issuing CPGs and monitoring compliance 
with them.  Moreover, the government’s incentive and ability to influence 
clinical practice may grow stronger as national health reform following the 
PPACA is implemented, creating an opportunity for a comprehensive 
approach to public guideline development that combines clinical quality 
with cost and coverage for conditions where research has revealed 
suboptimal quality and/or economic waste.  A significant caution, however, 
is that political polarization over the risks of “socializing medicine” or 
rationing may discourage the creation of CPGs by the government, 
particularly for medical procedures influenced by powerful special interest 
groups.  Indeed, despite its size, budget, and power, the government has 
significant drawbacks as a source of CPGs.  Physicians and the public 
usually view the government with suspicion when it seeks to intrude on the 
autonomy of the medical profession in diagnosing and treating patients. 
Hence we have a conflict between CPGs as a public good and the 
autonomy of doctors.  This is particularly true when the government 
attempts to alter a clinical norm regarding risk-benefit calculations, as 
exemplified by PSA-screening for prostate cancer, the recently renewed 
debate over mammography for middle-aged women, or the continuing 
controversy over the potential side-effects of childhood vaccination.60  
 The government has insufficient personnel with the appropriate 
skills to produce a large number of detailed guidelines.  The cost of 
developing guidelines through public processes is also high and politically 
                                                                                                                 
60 See Sarah Kliff, Many Doctors Think PSA Tests Don’t Work. But They’ll 
Keep Doing Them Anyway, WASH. POST, May 29, 2012, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/post/many-doctors-think-psa-
tests-dont-work-but-theyll-keep-doing-them-anyway/2012/05/29/gJQAOl0qyU_ 
blog.html; Eliot Marshall, Brawling Over Mammography, 327 SCIENCE 936 (2010) 
(describing the public reaction to recent mammography guidelines); H. Gilbert 
Welch, Screening Mammography: A Long Run for a Short Slide?, 363 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 1276 (2010) (suggesting that the mortality benefits from mammography 
may have declined as treatment options have improved); Liza Gross, A Broken 
Trust: Lessons from the Vaccine-Autism Wars, 7 PLOS BIOL. (2009) (describing 
the long battle over thimerosol and autism). 
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exposed. Because guidelines must be routinely updated and corrected, the 
administrative burden and associated political risk would resurface 
frequently. 61  In order to properly promulgate and update CPGs, a 
government agency would need to be well funded, closely connected to 
care delivery, and sheltered from political pressure by special interest 
groups.62  
 
b.  Self-Regulation 
 
 Self-regulation in the health care system is most commonly 
associated with physicians and other health professionals, but it may also 
include health care facilities, suppliers, and even insurers.  Professional 
organizations such as the American Medical Association and societies in 
each medical specialty promulgate ethical rules and standards of conduct 
that guide physician members’ behavior.  In the US, law and tradition 
allow the organized medical profession to maintain a surprising degree of 
collective control over physician education, training, licensing, 
disciplining, hospital affiliation, and even liability insurance. Nurses, 
                                                                                                                 
61  Guidelines are time-consuming and expensive both to develop and to 
update. See Richard Amerling et al., Guidelines Have Done More Harm Than 
Good, 26 BLOOD PURIFICATION 73 (2008). Often, the result is that guidelines are 
not based on the full evidence available. A 2001 study examined 17 guidelines 
developed by U.S. Agency for Health Care Research and Quality. See Paul G. 
Shekelle et al., Validity of the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
Clinical Practice Guidelines: How Quickly Do Guidelines Become Outdated?, 286 
JAMA 1461, 1461 (2001). Seven of the guidelines needed to be updated with new 
“diagnostic or therapeutic guideline recommendations” or withdrawn. Id. Six 
warranted marginal adjustments to their recommendations. Id. The methodology 
and development process for AHRQ guidelines were considered to represent a 
drastic improvement in the “science of practice guideline development.” Id. at 
1462. Yet, half of them were obsolete in 5.8 years and the study recommended that 
the guidelines be reevaluated for suitability every three years. Id. at 1461. Another 
cost-related concern is that providers do not have the necessary resources to 
comply with the guidelines. Ronni P. Solomon, Clinical Guidelines in the United 
States: Perspectives on Law and Litigation, in CLINICAL GUIDELINES: LAW, 
POLICY AND PRACTICE 137, 146 (John Tingle ed., 2002). 
62 See generally Bruce C. Vladeck, The Political Economy of Medicare, 18 
HEALTH AFF. 22 (1998) (explaining interest group politics); Lawrence R. Jacobs, 
Politics of America’s Supply State: Health Reform and Technology, 14 HEALTH 
AFF. 143 (1995) (arguing that no collective force counters the political power of 
provider and supplier groups). 
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pharmacists, and other practitioners claim similar but generally lesser 
privileges to regulate their own professions.  
 Self-regulation may be preferable to direct government control 
when technical expertise is required, when cooperation from the regulated 
entities is important, or when the regulated industry is undergoing rapid 
change that outpaces public oversight.  Self-regulation usually will seem 
cheaper for the government than direct regulation because it is off-budget 
and less visible politically, and it may also be cheaper if compliance costs 
are lower.  On the other hand, self-regulation can be insular, self-serving, 
and anti-competitive if improperly executed.  Despite those concerns, 
medicine has historically enjoyed wide latitude to self-regulate because of 
public deference to physician expertise and professional ethics.  
 Self-regulation can take various forms pertaining to guidelines. 
Self-regulatory organizations can issue guidelines directly.  Many current 
guideline producers are non-profit, educational organizations.  In the US, 
the most prominent category of issuer is made up of medical specialty 
societies and other professional organizations, which promulgate guidelines 
focused on the effectiveness of treatment.63 However, these entities are 
seldom well funded and may not be able to afford to update CPGs on a 
continuing basis in a rapidly changing world.  In general, such 
organizations usually do not feel pressed to account for costs of care, and 
may be biased towards quality over efficiency.  
 Self-regulatory organizations can also certify guidelines produced 
by others and also may accredit those producers.  The imprimatur of an 
accrediting or certification body is typically used to convey information 
about superior quality or reliability to a purchaser or user of a product or 
service.  As noted above, the IOM recently recommended the establishment 
of a public-private partnership to certify guideline issuers in terms of 
compliance with best practices regarding guideline production that an IOM 
committee had identified.  
 State professional licensing boards exemplify what is often called 
“statutory” or “delegated” self-regulation.  In this model, a legislature 
confers broad discretion on what is a nominally governmental body but that 
is practically controlled by the regulated class of individuals.  Physicians 
often have considerable influence over medical licensing boards, for 
example, although public concern about safety has eroded the profession’s 
                                                                                                                 
63 Stefan Timmermans & Emily S. Kolker, Evidence-Based Medicine and the 
Reconfiguration of Medical Knowledge, 45 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 177, 184 
(2004). 
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dominance in recent years.  The Joint Commission is a very powerful self-
regulatory body for hospitals and other health facilities in the US, and has 
delegated authority insofar as is its accreditation substitutes by law for 
direct government qualification of health facilities for participation in 
Medicare and Medicaid. Because of its reliance on convened groups of 
private experts, NICE in the UK often functions as a statutory self-
regulatory body.  Although existing statutory self-regulators in the US 
could issue or certify CPGs, none has yet done so.  Even the Joint 
Commission standards, designed to ensure quality of care, do not specify 
treatment processes. 
 An alternative model is “supervised self-regulation.” This is 
something like what used to happen in the US in healthcare, as outlined in 
the Public Model section of Part IV.  In this model, a formal government 
regulatory body backstops a self-regulatory organization.  A prominent 
example of this in another field is the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.  The SEC has the right and obligation to review the work of 
various self-regulatory boards that adopt standards for matters such as 
corporate accounting practices and the operation of securities exchanges 
and to overrule them if it deems necessary.  
In health care, certain Medicare contractors – particularly those 
engaging in quality improvement activities under explicit statutory 
authorization – function as supervised self-regulators.  Unlike delegated 
self-regulation, a supervised model empowers an existing agency such as 
AHRQ, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), or the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to ensure that self-regulatory 
organizations charged with issuing guidelines are honest and competent.  
This might take the form of certifying the processes used by each producer, 
as suggested in the 2011 IOM Report.  
Self-regulation can operate locally as well, with monitoring and 
compliance systems internal to organizations being self-imposed or 
expressly required by the government or another self-regulator.  For 
example, internal self-regulation by a “self-governing medical staff” is 
required for most hospitals by state law and by the Joint Commission 
accreditation standards.  History, however, cautions us against locally 
produced or approved CPGs.  The principal justification for pursuing 
guidelines as a regulatory enterprise was the failure of reliable professional 
norms to develop in local, self-regulated physician communities.  It would 
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be ironic to turn to the same communities to create or bless guidelines.64 
National self-regulatory organizations would likely create better, evidence-
based products. 
 
c.  Private Sector 
 
Many types of private organizations produce and deploy clinical 
practice guidelines.  These efforts vary widely with respect to the quality 
and impartiality of the guidelines produced and also with respect to the 
transparency of the process of producing them.  They also vary in the 
degree to which guidelines are considered corporate assets intended for 
internal use as opposed to external dissemination.  
 Increasingly, guidelines are developed and/or purchased or 
modified prior to implementation by large clinical entities.  These include 
closed-panel HMOs, hospital-based integrated delivery systems, prepaid 
group practices, multispecialty clinics, and less unitary but still structurally 
coherent networks ranging from the independent practice associations 
(IPAs) of the 1990s to the accountable care organizations (ACOs) of today.  
Many, but far from all of these organizations, are non-profit corporations.  
Health care providers compete primarily on the underlying services and 
may view guidelines as proprietary business tools rather than common 
educational resources.65  
Among private, guideline-producing organizations targeting 
independent physicians, several are interested in reducing health care costs 
as well as improving quality.  These producers, including managed care 
organizations, health insurers, and a handful of large, self-insured 
employers,66 similarly may have business-related objectives for issuing and 
using guidelines on a competitive basis.67   
                                                                                                                 
64  See Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, Medicare Spending, The 
Physician Workforce, And Beneficiaries' Quality Of Care, 23 HEALTH AFF. 184 
(2004). 
65 A search of private, for-profit guidelines yielded only seven guidelines, 
whereas the nonprofit search yielded 154 guidelines from a wide array of 
organizations. A search for guidelines from Hospital/Medical Centers yielded 38 
guidelines (of the approximately 2356 available) from only 3-4 organizations. 
66 Rosoff, supra note 24, at 374.   A search in the NGC dataset revealed, for 
example, that Kaiser Permanente (an MCO) has about 10 guidelines posted.  
67 Two private for-profit firms that came up in NGC’s database were the Reed 
Group, which is a company dedicated to getting injured employees back to work at 
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Benefits consultants, pharmacy benefit managers, disease 
management companies, and similar entities may also regard guidelines as 
proprietary.  Health care suppliers, such as pharmaceutical and medical 
device companies, frequently see guidelines as critical marketing tools for 
their products, or, if a particular guideline does not support that purpose, 
they view them as a threat to revenue.  Malpractice insurers for physicians 
or hospitals may also issue or use guidelines in connection with their risk 
management activities.  Some of these organizations already have the 
structures in place to organically develop a private model of CPGs similar 
to the private regulation regime discussed in Part IV.   
These various entities are usually well funded and have the 
requisite expertise to write useful guidelines.  However, they all have very 
different financial goals, particularly if the cost of suboptimal guidelines is 
borne elsewhere.  For example, CPGs produced by third-party payers may 
emphasize cost control over quality, possibly externalizing costs onto 
liability insurers if injury ensues. 68  In contrast, guidelines issued by 
physician groups anticipating fee-for-service payment may emphasize 
quality over cost control.  CPGs produced by liability insurers, in turn, may 
emphasize claims avoidance, with safe care a secondary objective and 
efficient care not prioritized, which tends to externalize costs onto both 
patients and third-party payers.69 Thus, physicians are sometimes forced to 
choose among conflicting guidelines with different goals.70  
Other private producers of guidelines have primarily political 
objectives.  Certain professional and trade groups seek to influence public 
                                                                                                                 
full-productivity and the Smith & Nephew, which is primarily a medical device 
manufacturer in Ireland. 
68 For example, HMOs may prefer fewer treatments to contain costs because 
they fully bear the costs of treatments, but do not fully bear the costs of 
malpractice. 
69  For example, malpractice insurers would require doctors to perform 
mammograms every year to prevent breast cancer, even if they are not needed, 
because the malpractice insurers do not bear the costs of extra mammograms, but 
do bear the costs of lawsuits from late diagnosis of breast cancer. 
70 Patricia R. Recupero, Clinical Practice Guidelines as Learned Treatises: 
Understanding Their Use as Evidence in the Courtroom, 36 J. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCHIATRY L. 290, 298 (2008). Guidelines need not all be the same – for example 
a guideline could call for a more expensive treatment than is necessary – but to be 
covered under this premium guideline, rather than a standard guideline, one should 
be required to pay more into the system and thus be financially accountable for 
their choice of coverage. 
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opinion, legislation, and regulation that determine which health professions 
and which treatments receive favorable consideration.  Similar risks may 
arise when leading physician researchers are called upon to develop CPGs 
because they may have financial relationships with pharmaceutical or 
medical device manufacturers who wish to have their products 
recommended by experts.  
If guidelines are challenged in court, these varying incentives and 
potential biases may become a focal point of litigation rather than the 
guidelines being regarded as “a generally recognized standard of care 
within the medical profession”.71 During the 1980s and 1990s, courts were 
sensitized to the risk of bias in health insurance contracts as managed care 
became more aggressive about denying coverage for lack of medical 
necessity.72 More recently, financial relationships between pharmaceutical 
manufacturers and health care providers have raised concerns about 
conflicts of interests influencing clinical standards and practices. 73 
Fortunately, we now recognize neutrality as the myth that it is and can 
adjust our governance models to account for the fact that CPG authors 
bring their own biases to the drafting process. 
  
d.  Courts 
 
In the US, the health care system tends to be monitored by an ad 
hoc mixture of public law (i.e. Medicare and Medicaid) and private law 
represented by individual litigation over contractual agreements or personal 
injuries.  In this system, it is possible for judges – typically those serving 
on state rather than federal courts – to create “common law” regarding 
CPGs by interpreting contracts, determining the scope of fiduciary duties, 
allocating property rights, and holding producers of CPGs and other health 
                                                                                                                 
71 See Quigley v. Jobe, 851 P.2d 236, 238 (Colo. App. 1992) (holding that 
guidelines written by a liability insurance carrier did not meet the relevance test for 
scientific evidence, because they were created “by a private insurance company as 
part of an insurance contract and did not reflect a generally recognized standard of 
care within the medical profession.”). 
72 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 112-13 (1989) 
73 See COMM. ON CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN MED. RESEARCH, EDUC., & 
PRACTICE, INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS, CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN 
MEDICAL RESEARCH, EDUCATION, AND PRACTICE (Bernard Lo & Marilyn J. Field, 
eds., 2009); William M. Sage, Some Principles Require Principals: Why Banning 
“Conflicts of Interest” Won’t Solve Incentive Problems in Biomedical Research, 
85 TEX. L. REV. 1413 (2007). 
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care providers liable to patients under tort law.  Should such cases occur 
frequently, an accountability regime for guidelines might emerge 
organically without the creation of an explicit legislative or regulatory 
framework.  But this seems unlikely to occur as the most victims of 
medical errors are not aware of them, and of those aware the vast majority 
does not file suits, and of those filing suits, the vast majority settle, never 
making it to courts.  
A more plausible outcome is episodic litigation resulting in judicial 
decisions that send strong, albeit indirect, signals to health care 
stakeholders regarding the value and enforceability of CPGs.  Normally, 
CPGs are brought up in the context of medical malpractice litigation, which 
usually plays an important role in molding physicians’ opinions about the 
acceptability of any proposed alteration to their clinical practices and 
standards. 74  Product liability lawsuits are also important indicators for 
manufacturers of drugs, medical devices, vaccines, and diagnostic tests.  
For health insurers, guidelines typically surface in disputes over benefits 
and coverage denials, such as in the interpretation of policy provisions 
regarding medical necessity or experimental treatment.75  
Medical malpractice litigation, for example, generates 
accountability mechanisms for guidelines that have particular 
characteristics.  Civil litigation ordinarily gives considerable deference to 
the discretion of individual judges in making evidentiary rulings.  
Accordingly, only a small number of structured guideline programs have 
been attempted in the malpractice context, and those have been heavily 
negotiated to respect judicial prerogatives and to operate through 
presumptions and affirmative defenses as opposed to conclusive 
determinations of liability or immunity from liability.  
 
                                                                                                                 
74 William M. Sage, Reputation, Malpractice Liability, and Medical Error, in 
ACCOUNTABILITY: PATIENT SAFETY AND POLICY REFORM 159 (2004). 
75 Like medical malpractice, insurance coverage law has both a technical and a 
symbolic importance to oversight of health care quality. See Nan D. Hunter, 
Managed Process, Due Care: Structures of Accountability in Health Care, 6 YALE 
J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 93 (2006); William M. Sage, Managed Care’s 
Crimea: Medical Necessity, Therapeutic Benefit, and the Goals of Administrative 
Process in Health Insurance, 53 DUKE L.J. 597 (2003); Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. 
Anderson, Health Insurers’ Assessment of Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 
1637 (1992). 
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III.  HOW ARE CPGS CURRENTLY USED? 
 
Although systematic efforts to provide governance and 
accountability mechanisms for CPGs have been lacking in the US, 
substantial experience has accumulated over the last two decades regarding 
the relationship between guidelines and the law.  While these experiences 
underscore the desirability of consciously creating accountability in the 
world of guidelines, they do not offer clear lessons for how such 
accountability should be achieved. 
The success of CPGs in replacing customary care with evidence-
based medicine depends primarily upon the level of acceptance of CPGs 
within the medical profession. 76  The law’s treatment of guidelines is 
critical to this process and to their acceptance by other stakeholders whose 
confidence in guidelines as a policy innovation is affected by how such 
guidelines are perceived by independent legal decision-makers such as 
judges and legislators.77 This section surveys the way CPGs have been 
treated by courts, insurance companies and various state level initiatives.   
 
A.  CPG USE IN LITIGATION: A CASE STUDY FROM 2000-2010 
 
How courts and lawyers are actually using CPGs in malpractice 
litigation has not been definitively established.  The most comprehensive 
study of court usage of CPGs was published almost two decades ago by 
Hyams, Shapiro, and Brennan. 78  They conducted surveys of medical 
malpractice attorneys and reviewed of all relevant case law from January 1, 
1980 through May 31, 1994.79 That study and subsequent articles suggest 
                                                                                                                 
76 Arnold J. Rosoff, The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Healthcare 
Reform: An Update, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 21, 25-26 (2012). 
77  Arnold J. Rosoff, Evidence-Based Medicine and the Law: The Courts 
Confront Clinical Practice Guidelines, 26 J. HEALTH POLIT., POL. & L. 327, 331 
(2001) [hereinafter Rosoff, Evidence-Based Medicine]; see also Arnold J. Rosoff, 
On Being a Physician in the Electronic Age: Peering into the Mists at Point-&-
Click Medicine, 46 ST. LOUIS L.J. 111, 115 (2002) (outlining the use of Clinical 
Decision Support Systems as a form of Clinical Practice Guidelines). 
78  Andrew L. Hyams et al., Medical Practice Guidelines in Malpractice 
Litigation: An Early Retrospective, 21 J. HEALTH POLIT., POL. & L. 289 (1996) 
[hereinafter Hyams et al.]. 
79 Id. at 295. 
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that courts have historically been hesitant to use CPGs in medical 
malpractice cases.80 
Hyams and colleagues found only thirty-seven published cases 
involving the use of CPGs.  Of those published decisions, the Hyams study 
identified twenty-two cases of successful inculpatory use and six cases of 
successful exculpatory use.81 However, the attorney surveys indicated that 
the profession was indeed aware of CPGs, and that guidelines aided in 
settlement negotiations and even in the decision of whether or not to take 
certain cases.82  
I extended the Hyams study by finding and analyzing judicial 
decisions involving CPGs in any context published between January 2000 
and March 2010.83 The review indicates that use of guidelines by courts 
continues to be sporadic and mostly conservative.  The use of guidelines 
for inculpatory purposes has tended to increase, though the sample size is 
so small that few conclusions can be drawn.  Of the twenty-eight cases 
found with parties using guidelines in some form, sixteen (57%) involved 
their use by plaintiffs as swords compared to 78% of cases in the Hyams 
study.  Twelve cases (43%) involved CPG use by defendants as shields 
compared to 22% in the Hyams study.84 Interestingly, in eight of the twelve 
                                                                                                                 
80 Id. at 310.  See also Rosoff, Evidence-Based Medicine, supra note 77, at 
352; see also Mello, supra note 57 (discussing the different ways in which courts 
have approached medical malpractice).  For a more detailed discussion of the 
Hyams et al. study, see Avraham, Warped Incentives, supra note 1, at 18–19. 
81 Hyams et al., supra note 78, at 296. 
82 Rosoff, Evidence-Based Medicine, supra note 77, at 341. 
83  The search was performed looking for the appearance of “medical” or 
“medicine” as well as “guideline” in all 50 state jurisdictions and in federal courts.  
Sometimes courts may discuss guidelines without necessarily referring to them as 
such, so a second search was run using terms like “algorithm” and “standard.”  To 
attempt to weed out results where “standard” appeared merely as a part of 
“standard of proof” or a legal “standard,” cases also were required to have 
“medicine,” “medical,” “hospital,” “doctor,” or “physician” in the text. While these 
results are likely not comprehensive (and there were surely cases missed which 
might have discussed clinical practice guidelines in some form), it’s most probable 
that these cases would not have dealt with guidelines extensively and thus would 
not have added a great deal to the discussion. 
84 Hyams et al., supra note 78, at 296. 
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cases where guidelines were used for exculpatory purposes, the defendant 
was successful.85  
These cases devoted little significant analysis to what organization 
drafted the relevant guidelines, and there was not a clear plurality of any 
one association’s guidelines being used successfully.  Guidelines written by 
the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) and the 
Centers for Disease Control did appear repeatedly, but whether this was a 
function of the guidelines or a correlate of the type of injury alleged is not 
clear.  Discussion tended to center on applicability, relevance, or 
evidentiary acceptability and not on the quality of the guidelines 
themselves.  
 While the full extent of court use of CPGs is unknown, if they are 
to eventually be effective in reducing the costs of medical malpractice 
litigation, the legal system will need to accept generalized use more 
definitively than published cases suggest.  As reflected in the cases, current 
obstacles to CPG adoption in court include the connection between 
evidence-based guidelines and the concept of a professionally determined 
standard of care, hearsay objections, 86  the battle between competing 
guidelines or experts,87 and how seemingly “one-size-fits-all” guidelines 
should yield to physician judgment in individual cases.88  
                                                                                                                 
85 There are several caveats. First, our findings are based on published judicial 
decisions, which are uncommon in medical malpractice litigation. Second, trials 
are rare events in malpractice litigation, so that the evidentiary use of guidelines 
does not necessarily capture the impact guidelines may have on the vast majority 
of malpractice cases that settle. Lastly, because it is so difficult to determine when 
the use of guidelines is dispositive, these figures do not necessarily indicate 
whether the cases were successful because of the use of guidelines. 
86 The Hyams study notes increasing willingness of courts to use the hearsay 
exception for learned treatises as an avenue to admitting guidelines as evidence.  
The trend towards the admissibility of guidelines has continued, although they are 
still not accepted to prove standard of care on their own.  Rather, litigants almost 
always employ an expert witness to act as the conduit for admitting guidelines. 
Hyams et al., supra note 78. 
87 See Mello, supra note 57, at 684; see also Avraham, Private Regulation, 
supra note 1, 618–19 (discussing the so called “battle of the guidelines” and the 
solution provided by Avraham’s private model for CPGs). 
88 978 So.2d 1257 (La. App. 2008). In Bond v. U.S. the court quoted the 
ACC/AHA guidelines to make this point: “These practice guidelines are intended 
to assist physicians in clinical decision-making by describing a range of generally 
acceptable approaches for the diagnosis, management, or prevention of specific 
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B.  CPG USE BY THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 
 
 The law has also accounted for guidelines in regulation and 
litigation concerning health insurance coverage.  Before the 1960s, health 
insurers and the community of medical professionals maintained a general 
understanding that those responsible for payment would not interfere with 
clinical decisions.  As the cost of health care began to rise, however, this 
understanding was revisited and eventually abrogated, particularly in the 
1980s and 1990s.89 
 CPGs have been connected with the insurance industry primarily 
through regulation and litigation over the definition of “medically 
necessary care,” and the related question of whether or not a proposed 
treatment should be excluded from coverage because it is “experimental” 
or “investigational.” Over the last few decades, hundreds of judicial 
decisions have interpreted these contractual exclusions from coverage in 
disputes between patients and private insurers, Medicaid, and Medicare.90 
A common theme in the decisions is the desire of judges to assure 
themselves that coverage denials are not merely financially motivated 
efforts that incidentally deprive patients of scientifically correct care.  As a 
result, the law has struggled to find preferred sources of evidence about 
optimal practice procedures – in other words, CPGs.  
                                                                                                                 
diseases or conditions . . . The ultimate judgment regarding the care of a particular 
patient must be made by the physician and patient in light of all of the available 
information and the circumstances presented by that patient.” 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 19881 at *25 (D. Or. 2008).  For more information on these problems and 
more see Avraham, Warped Incentives, supra note 1, at 18–20. 
89 Indeed, virtually all the fashionable innovations in health care organization, 
payment, and accountability today – including ACOs – are direct descendants of 
1990s-style managed care. See Kip Sullivan, The History and Definition of the 
“Accountable Care Organization” (October 2010), Physicians for a National 
Health Program California, http://pnhpcalifornia.org/2010/10/the-history-and-
definition-of-the-%E2%80%9Caccountable-care-organization%E2%80%9D/. 
90 See Mark A. Hall & Gerald F. Anderson, Health Insurers' Assessment of 
Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637 (1992); Mark A. Hall, Teresa Rust 
Smith, Michelle Naughton & Andrea Ebbers, Judicial Protection of Managed Care 
Consumers: An Empirical Study of Insurance Coverage Disputes, 26 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 1055, 1056, 1058 (1996); William M. Sage, Judicial Opinions Involving 
Health Insurance Coverage: Trompe L'oeil or Window on the World?, 31 IND. L. 
REV. 49, 49 (1998). 
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During the 1990s, some state lawmakers also began to combine 
health insurance benefit mandates with evidence-based coverage standards 
in particularly contentious scenarios, like in regard to access to clinical 
trials and denials of coverage involving potentially lifesaving treatments.91 
These laws are important to a discussion of governance and accountability 
for CPGs because they involve the government in establishing a hierarchy 
of evidence and mandatory procedures to be used to regulate access to 
cutting-edge clinical resources.    
More generally, mandated benefit laws for a variety of health care 
services are common at the state level, although the federal ERISA statute 
prevents them from being applied to self-insured employer-based coverage. 
Requirements that health plans in a state cover certain benefits are typically 
enacted at the behest of providers with focused interests and/or patient 
groups with sympathetic needs.  This has resulted in a large set of statutes 
that define a specific, favored clinical service.  Mandated benefit laws are 
not CPGs in intent or substance, but they are important to understanding 
how the law can explicitly specify clinical tasks that were historically left 
up to physician discretion.  
 
C.  SYSTEMATIC GUIDELINE INITIATIVES 
 
Both state and federal governments have attempted to confer a 
larger public policy role on clinical practice guidelines in the recent past. 
These efforts have tended to coincide with periods of interest in 
comprehensive health care reform, with peaks in the late 1980s and the 
early 1990s, and another peak just emerging in connection with the advent 
of Obamacare.  Systematic guideline initiatives have focused on medical 
malpractice reform as well as more general improvements in the cost-
effectiveness of health care, with unnecessary health care spending (such as 
defensive medicine) representing the conceptual connection between 
them.92  
 
1.   AHCPR’s Guideline Program 
 
The first major attempt at using medical guidelines reform to spur 
broader healthcare improvement was in 1989 when Congress created the 
                                                                                                                 
91 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §14132.98 (West 2002). 
92 For more on state specific projects, see Avraham, supra note 1 (discussing 
other projects in Vermont, Minnesota, Kentucky, Maryland, and Texas). 
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Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR) to “enhance the 
quality, appropriateness, and effectiveness of health care services” through, 
among other things, “the development and periodic review and updating of 
. . . clinically relevant guidelines.” 93  Several years later, the Clinton 
administration attempted to take this initiative a step further by proposing a 
medical liability pilot program based on the practice guidelines developed 
by the AHCPR.  Under the pilot program, doctors who could show that 
their actions were consistent with relevant practice guidelines could avoid 
medical malpractice liability.94  
Because of political opposition to President Clinton’s healthcare 
reform and fierce interest group politics, President Clinton’s experimental 
initiative stalled and the AHCPR was almost completely eliminated in 
1995.95  
 
 
                                                                                                                 
93 Mello, supra note 57, at 651 (quoting Stephen M. Merz, Clinical Practice 
Guidelines: Policy Issues and Legal Implications, 19 JOINT COMMISSION J. ON 
QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 306, 307 (1993)). 
94 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: MAINE’S USE OF 
PRACTICE GUIDELINES TO REDUCE COSTS 1–2 (Oct. 1993), available at 
http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/policy/150172.pdf. 
  95  The conflict that nearly eliminated the AHCPR emerged from a debate 
regarding spinal fusion surgery. Following many years of controversy over the merits 
of surgical procedures for low-back disorders, AHCPR funded a study that 
concluded that there was no evidence to support the use of spinal fusion surgery, that 
such surgery commonly had complications, and that more randomized controlled 
trials were needed to compare fusion surgery with non-surgical treatment. An 
association of back surgeons who disagreed with the conclusions launched an attack 
on the study and the agency itself. Bradford H. Gray, et al., AHCPR and The 
Changing Politics Of Health Services Research, HEALTH AFFAIRS W3-283, W3-297, 
available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2003/06/25/hlthaff.w3.283. 
The Center for Patient Advocacy, which was formed by a back surgeon to lobby on 
the issue, mobilized an effort in the House of Representatives to end the agency’s 
funding. Only on the night of the vote was an amendment to reduce the agency’s 
budget to zero withdrawn, leaving the agency instead with a 21% budget cut. Id. at 
W3-295. The 1995 battle between the AHRQ and the back physicians was not the 
first time AHRQ faced attacks by physician groups. Earlier in 1993, an AHCPR 
study came under attack from various ophthalmology associations. Id. at W3-297. 
However, that attack never extended to attempts to defund AHCPR, and it came to 
an end when the ophthalmologists discovered they could use the data to discredit a 
GAO study alleging that inappropriate cataract surgery was widespread and to get 
insurers to pay for some surgery. Id. 
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One of the consequences of this battle was that the agency dropped 
its CPG development program and initiated support for external evidence-
based practice centers that organize data to help private-sector 
organizations develop CPGs.  In 1999, Congress passed legislation that 
changed the agency’s name to the Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality (AHRQ). AHRQ has since become a major force in the 
dissemination of medical guidelines, though the actual creation of CPGs 
was eliminated from its mission.96  
   
2.   Maine’s Malpractice Guideline Project 
 
Maine was home to the most famous project that established 
clinical practice guidelines as statutory standards of care for physicians to 
use as a defense in malpractice suits. 97  The Maine Medical Liability 
Demonstration Project was a ten-year pilot study that began in 1989 and 
expired in 1999.  It instituted special advisory committees in charge of 
developing CPGs for four practice areas viewed as hotbeds for malpractice 
litigation and suspected defensive medicine.  Maine subsequently adopted 
twenty guidelines in anesthesiology, emergency medicine, 
obstetrics/gynecology, and radiology.  
Physicians, hospitals, and managed care organizations that elected 
to participate could use the guidelines as an affirmative defense against any 
malpractice claim.  Plaintiffs bringing such claims, however, could not 
introduce the guidelines into evidence to argue that failure to comply was 
malpractice.98 The guidelines were only available as a shield because the 
purpose of the reform was to reduce overall liability, a common purpose for 
reforms adopted during or after the malpractice insurance crisis of the mid-
1980s.  
The Maine project had little practical effect.99 Few doctors believed 
these regulations had any discernible impact on the malpractice system, and 
                                                                                                                 
  96 See Avraham, Private Regulation, supra note 1, at 577–78. 
97  Linda L. LeCraw, Use of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Medical 
Malpractice Litigation, 3 J. ONCOLOGY PRAC. 254 (2007). 
98 ME. REV. STAT. Tit. 24, §§ 2975, 2977 (1993). 
99 LeCraw, supra note 97. By one estimate, the guidelines affected only about 
three to four percent of medical practice in Maine. See Gordon H. Smith, A Case 
Study in Progress: Practice Guideline5 and the Affirmative Defense in Maine, 19 
Joint Commission J. ON QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 355, 361 (1993). 
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the affirmative defense was raised in only one case.100 The superintendent 
of the Maine Bureau of Insurance concluded “the medical demonstration 
project had no measurable effect on medical professional liability claims, 
claims settlement costs, or malpractice premiums.”101 
 
3.  Florida’s C-Section Guideline Project 
 
In 1994, concerns over the cost of defensive medicine prompted 
Florida to initiate its own CPG project to be administered by the state’s 
Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA).102 Similar to the Maine 
project in many respects, the Florida project created an affirmative defense 
for participating physicians, provided that they followed specific clinical 
practice guidelines.  
The primary difference from the Maine project was that Florida did 
not explicitly prevent plaintiffs from using the guidelines to help prove 
physicians failed to meet the standard of care, or from using the guidelines 
as a liability sword. 103  However, lack of physician compliance with 
guidelines did not create a prima facie case of negligence, and physicians 
were given leeway to demonstrate whether their decision to deviate from 
the guidelines was prudent given the specific circumstances of the case.104 
Florida’s guideline project concentrated on only one procedure.105 
Florida chose deliveries by caesarean section for their test project because 
it was the most common surgical procedure performed in Florida hospitals 
                                                                                                                 
100  Howard Zonana, Commentary: When Is a Practice Guideline Only a 
Guideline?, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L., 302, 303 (2008). 
101 LeCraw, supra note 97, at 254 (citing ME. BUREAU OF INS. AND BD. OF LIC. 
IN MED., MEDICAL LIABILITY DEMONSTRATION PROJECT 2 AND 5 (2000)).  Similar 
to Maine, in 1992 Minnesota also attempted to use clinical practice guidelines as a 
tool for health care reform, but the state never created the required guidelines to get 
the project off the ground. 1992 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 549 art. 7 (H.F. 2800); 
1995 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 234; see also William Trail & Brad Allen, 
Government Created Medical Practice Guidelines: The Opening of Pandora's Box, 
10 J.L. & HEALTH 231, 247 (1995). 
102  FLORIDA AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, PRACTICE 
GUIDELINES AS AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE: THE CESAREAN DEMONSTRATION PROJECT 
REPORT (1998). 
103 Trail, supra note 101, at 246.  
104 Id. 
105 FLA. STAT. § 408.02(9) (1996). 
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at the time.106 Supporters predicted that the C-section rate would decline if 
physicians practiced in accordance with the guidelines.  However, the 
affirmative defense proved to be an inadequate incentive to convince 
physicians to participate.  Only 20% of eligible physicians participated, and 
it was determined that the ones who did participate were already less likely 
to perform C-sections.  
Overall, Florida’s effort had little effect on physician behavior.  
The primary barriers included lack of awareness, lack of familiarity with 
the guidelines, and lack of agreement with the validity of the guidelines.107  
 
4.  Ongoing Initiatives 
 
This section provides a brief overview of some of the current 
attempts to improve quality and reduce health care costs using CPGs.  
 
a. Federal Malpractice Reform Demonstrations 
 
The Obama administration’s 2012 budget proposal included $250 
million for state-based alternatives to tort litigation for medical 
malpractice, with guidelines prominently featured among the favored 
reform approaches.108 These funds were not authorized or appropriated by 
Congress, but the proposal still represents a renewed interest in CPG use.  
Previously, AHRQ had awarded $25 million for planning and 
demonstration grants in states, communities, and provider organizations 
that integrate improvements in patient safety with improvements in medical 
malpractice litigation.109 CPGs fit this description, along with programs of 
error disclosure and offers of compensation, health courts, and a few other 
                                                                                                                 
106  J. Rosser Matthews, Practice Guidelines and Tort Reform: The Legal 
System Confronts the Technocratic Wish, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 275, 284 
(April 1999). 
107 In a study of the project, 54.5% of doctors surveyed attributed their failure 
to adhere to medical guidelines in part to a lack of awareness that relevant 
guidelines existed. Lack of familiarity with Florida’s guidelines was cited by 
56.5% as a cause of failure to adhere. 
108 Emily P. Walker, Obama’s Budget Includes $250M in Malpractice Grants, 
MED PAGE TODAY (Feb. 16, 2011), http://www.medpagetoday.com/Practice 
Management/Medicolegal/24904. 
109 Medical Liability Reform and Patient Safety, AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE 
RESEARCH AND QUALITY, http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/liability/. 
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innovations.110  However, only one of the 13 small planning grants – a 
project from the Office of Oregon Health Policy and Research – and none 
of the seven larger demonstration grants initially awarded involved 
CPGs.111 
 
b. The Oregon Health Authority 
 
Between 1987 and 1994, the Oregon Legislature ratified several 
laws that established the structure for a public and private partnership that 
cumulatively constituted the Oregon Health Plan (OHP).112 The Oregon 
Health Plan was originally designed to increase access to health care for 
lower income groups while controlling costs.  Under the plan, prioritized 
medical services were to be incorporated into the basic benefit package for 
both Medicaid beneficiaries as well as people covered by private insurance 
in the state.113 In order to maintain budgetary restraint, the plan aimed to 
ration care by limiting the range of services covered under the basic 
benefits package.114 The program was cancelled in 2003 due to rising costs.  
                                                                                                                 
110 Additional funds were committed to AHRQ for malpractice and patient 
safety demonstrations in connection with the new health reform law, and a 
substantial expansion of federally funded experimentation is possible. 
111  Medical Liability Reform & Patient Safety Grants, AGENCY FOR 
HEALTHCARE RESEARCH QUALITY, http://www.ahrq.gov/professionals/quality-
patient-safety/patient-safety-resources/resources/liability/medliabrep.html (last 
updated June 2010). 
112  See generally OR. REV. STAT. §§ 413.006 – 413.100, 414.065 (2013) 
(discussing the Oregon Health Authority and its policy-making and oversight body 
the Oregon Health Policy Board). 
113 Seventeen types of health ailments (including fatal acute conditions that 
can be fully treated, less serious acute problems, chronic conditions, maternity 
care, and preventative treatments) were established. Then, all diagnoses and 
corresponding care in both medical and surgical arenas were assigned to a 
particular category of health ailments. These diagnosis-treatment pairs were 
subsequently prioritized according to thirteen attributes (including life expectancy, 
quality of life, cost containment, clinical efficacy, net benefits, and number of 
people assisted by the treatment). Finally, based on the prioritized list and the 
state’s appropriations for the OHP, services and practices on the prioritized list 
above a certain level or ranking would be covered and those below the ranking 
would not be reimbursed. 
114 Vidhya Alakeson, Why Oregon Went Wrong, 337 BRITISH MED.  
J, 900, 901 (2008); Oregon Health Plan: An Historical Overview, OREGON 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, 3 (July 2006), available at 
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The rise in the number of uninsured residents, increased medical 
expenses, and reductions in employer-based health care prompted Oregon 
to revisit reform.  In 2009, the state ratified HB 2009, which established the 
Oregon Health Authority (OHA) and empowered it to streamline and 
harmonize the state’s health care programs.115 The OHA is responsible for 
improving efficiency, coordinating health administration, and executing the 
reforms mandated by HB 2009. 116  These reforms included developing 
“evidence-based clinical standards and practice guidelines that may be used 
by providers.” 117  The guidelines promulgated by the OHA, though not 
expressly given the force of law, could eventually come to represent the 
standard of care in disciplinary proceedings and malpractice suits.  
As noted, the OHA received one of the initial AHRQ planning 
grants for liability and patient safety innovation.  The results of the 
planning process were mixed.  In a report to AHRQ, the grantees estimated 
that 5% of malpractice injuries could have been avoided if clinicians had 
followed guidelines, but also found that cost savings from reduced 
defensive medicine and safe harbor laws would be minimal or non-
existent. 118  Although Oregon would have saved $4 million in medical 
liability costs under a safe harbor program, the additional administrative 
costs of such a program likely would have negated any savings.119 Given 
the patient safety benefits, one of the two pillars that support an increased 
role for CPGs, the report recommends additional research.120  
 
                                                                                                                 
http://www.oregon.gov/oha/healthplan/DataReportsDocs/Oregon%20Health%20Pl
an%20-%20An%20historical%20overview.pdf. 
115 Establishing Oregon Health Policy Board, H.R. HB 2009-C, 75th Leg. §20 
(Or. 2009). 
116 Id. at §§1, 9.  HB 2009 effectively dissolved the Oregon Health Fund Board 
and replaced it with the Oregon Health Policy Board (OHPB), which formulates 
policy and acts as the oversight body for the Oregon Health Authority. The nine-
member group is required to widen access, control the cost and quality of the 
health care delivery system, and enhance the health of Oregonians by developing 
state public health objectives, policies, initiatives, and benchmarks. 
117 OR. REV. STAT. § 413.011(e) (2013). 
118 Medical Liability & Patient Safety Planning Grant: Final Progress Report, 
AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH QUALITY 1, 10-11 (2012), http://www. 
oregon.gov/oha/OHPR/PSDM/AHRQ_MLPS_Report.pdf. 
119 Id. at 11. 
120 Id. at 14. 
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c.  The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
 
Signed into law in 2009 by President Obama, the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) included funding and 
administrative support for comparative effectiveness research, an area 
where CPGs play a prominent role.121 The ARRA appropriated $1.1 billion 
for comparative effectiveness studies, including comparative trials, medical 
registries, clinical databases, and methodical appraisals. 122  Furthermore, 
ARRA directed the IOM to conduct a national study of critical areas that 
could utilize comparative effectiveness and could capitalize on the 
appropriated funds.123 The 2009 law also created the Federal Coordinating 
Council for Comparative Effectiveness Research; a committee chaired by 
the Secretary of DHHS and composed of federal administrators and 
clinicians.  
Interestingly, while the council was directed to propose and 
organize research efforts, it was prohibited from using the studies to 
specify clinical practice guidelines or implementing changes in coverage 
and reimbursement procedures.124 Still, this series of studies can provide 
once completed important information that can be used by others to create 
effective CPGs 
 
d. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
 
Paralleling renewed interest in evidence-based guidelines and cost-
effective treatment, the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(PPACA) expands comparative effectiveness research. 125  The federal 
government designated a minimum of $500 million to pursue statistical 
studies that judge the efficacy of drugs, devices, and treatments.  PPACA 
also experiments with “new payment systems for doctors,” fines hospitals 
                                                                                                                 
121 American Recovery & Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 
Stat. 115 (2009). 
122  Id. The Agency for Health care Research and Quality (AHRQ) was 
designed to oversee $300 million of the $1.1 billion total, with $400 million 
directed by the National Institute of Health (NIH) and $400 million administered 
by the Department of human and Human Services (DHHS). 
123  Initial National Priorities for Comparative Effectiveness Research, 
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE 2 (2009). 
124 Robert Steinbrook, Health Care & the American Recovery & Reinvestment 
Act, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1057, 1058 (2009). 
125 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
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for “high readmission rates,” and establishes an independent commission to 
determine which procedures Medicare should reimburse.  The studies will 
be overseen by the newly created Patient-Centered Outcomes Research 
Institute (PCORI), which is authorized to determine research needs and 
perform studies that evaluate the relative usefulness of medical therapies.126  
Lastly, under the PPACA, AHRQ will occupy an integral role in 
designing, pursuing, and disseminating clinical effectiveness research.  The 
Act places AHRQ on the Board of Governors for the PCORI, and the 
agency must also work with the NIH to train researchers for the new 
studies and convey its findings.  In concert with DHHS, AHRQ and CMS 
will be granted $75 million over five years to jointly formulate quality 
standards.  To improve the quality of the provision of medical care, the 
PPACA also allocates $20 million to the AHRQ for the agency to 
determine, formulate, assess, and teach new processes and approaches in 
clinical practices between 2010 and 2014.127  
 The next section of the paper discusses three main models for 
ensuring trustworthiness of CPGs: the Public Model, the Semi-Public 
Model, and the Private Model.  The first two models exist or existed in the 
U.S and the U.K, the third is novel.  These discussions will highlight the 
benefits and drawbacks of each method. 
 
IV.  MODELS FOR STRUCTURED ACCOUNTABILITY FOR 
CPGS  
 
 In its 2011 Report, the IOM lays out eight standards that focus on 
the procedures by which CPGs are to be developed.  To enforce these 
standards the IOM recommends forming a private–public entity, which will 
provide a seal of approval to CPGs that meet those eight standards. But that 
is just one possible model (and one that I argue cannot work well in 
practice).  In this section I describe the several broad approaches to CPG 
quality control and explain the advantages and disadvantages of each one. 
One option is to approve the guideline itself.  Here the certifier (public, 
semi-public, or private) reviews the CPG and makes sure that it is optimal.  
A regime with a public certifier existed in the US in the past but no longer 
exists in pure form in the US or in the UK.  Part of this is because it can be 
                                                                                                                 
126 Alex Nussbaum et al., Obamacare’s Cost Scalpel, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK., 
Apr. 5, 2010, at 66. 
127 Patient Protection & Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 3013, 
3501, 6301, 10602, 124 Stat. 119, 381, 507, 727, 1005 (2010). 
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difficult to employ due to the time, resources, and expertise necessary to 
approve an individual guideline.  The more realistic method focuses on 
approving the process used to develop individual CPGs.  Professor Rosoff 
offered this model almost two decades ago.  
Alternatively, the certifier can approve the legitimacy of the 
institution that develops them.  In this system, the certifier provides a seal 
of approval for the entity promulgating the CPGs.  This gives the entity an 
approved status based on more general checkups and not based on any one 
individual guideline.  The downside of this approach is that the individual 
CPGs are not reviewed.  Such a system exists in the UK with a public 
certifier, and was proposed by the IOM (but with a public-private certifier) 
for the US.  
Lastly, there is a private model, proposed by Avraham, where 
guidelines are promulgated by private entities and compete in the market 
for the endorsement of practitioners.  The private model can take hold in 
two ways.  First, and most obvious, it can be created by legislation that 
changes our current system such that new organizations will emerge.  
Secondly, and perhaps more realistically, the regime will evolve 
incrementally from organizations that realize it is in everyone’s best 
interest to implement a private model of accountability to ensure high 
quality guidelines are drafted and used by physicians.   
The following table roughly summarizes this and demonstrates 
how the different models match the analysis:  
 
Table 1: Models of CPG Quality Control 
 
 
Certifier 
Public Model Semi Public 
Model 
Private 
Model 
In
sp
ec
te
d 
Output  
(CPGs themselves) 
US (old 
model), UK  Avraham 
Credentials of 
Promulgators  UK US (IOM)   
Procedures Used in 
specific Guidelines  Rosoff   
 
 
 
2014       OVERLOOKED AND UNDERUSED  313 
 
 
A.  THE PUBLIC MODEL 
 
 The Public Model actually consists of three variations, each of 
which is covered in this section of the Article.  The government can be the 
entity that actually drafts and publishes CPGs, it can certify entities that it 
deems qualified to publish reliable CPGs, or it can itself provide an 
approval system that evaluates the process by which CPGs are created and 
approves CPG meeting the stated requirements on an individualized basis. 
 
1.  Government Promulgating CPGs (UK & Old US Model) 
 
In general, the UK uses a public model, although promulgation of 
CPGs in the UK is not entirely centralized.  The Department of Health 
(DH)128 oversees the government health care system, the National Health 
Service (NHS).129 The NHS, in turn, coordinates with the DH’s various 
Arm’s Length Bodies (ALB),130 which are financed by the government but 
act independently, in order to help implement various functions of the 
NHS.  The ALB for standards of promulgation is the National Institute for 
Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE), 131  which is responsible for 
providing national guidance on the promotion of good health and the 
prevention and treatment of ill health within the NHS. 132  Through 
collaboration and a series of researching steps, NICE develops guidelines 
that suggest optimal practices for NHS health care practitioners.133 
                                                                                                                 
128 The Department of Health, GOV. UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/ 
organisations/department-of-health (last visited Sept. 3, 2012). 
129 The National Health Service, GOV. UK, http://www.nhs.uk/Pages/Home 
Page.aspx (last visited Sept. 3, 2012). 
130  Arm’s length bodies,  DEPT. OF HEALTH, 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/government/publications/arms-length-bodies/our-arms-
length-bodies (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
131  THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR HEALTH & CLINICAL EXCELLENCE, 
http://www.nice.org.uk/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2012). 
132  About NICE, NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH & CARE EXCELLENCE, 
http://www.nice.org.uk/aboutnice/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2014). 
133  Nat’l Inst. For Health and Care Excellence (NICE), Developing NICE 
Clinical Guidelines, http://www.nice.org.uk/aboutnice/howwework/developing 
niceclinicalguidelines/developing_nice_clinical_guidelines.jsp (last visited Feb. 
11, 2014). 
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In the US, as mentioned earlier in the paper, after a fierce political 
battle in the early 1990s, the AHRQ stopped promulgating guidelines.  The 
AHRQ now perceives itself as facilitating the creation of CPGs by other 
actors.  
Still, there are good reasons to think that the government should 
write and publish guidelines.  Other government agencies – such as CMS – 
write guidelines, and governments in other countries like the UK do as 
well.  For example, in September 2006, the Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention issued its “Revised Recommendations for HIV Testing of 
Adults, Adolescents, and Pregnant Women in Health-Care Settings.”134 
These examples of the public model point towards government agencies as 
a potentially desirable source of CPGs.  
 On the surface there is something appealing about the government 
writing guidelines because CPGs are, after all, a public good.  But how 
does this model of promulgation affect the quality of health care?  The 
foremost concern with this model is the issuing agency’s ability to keep its 
guidelines up-to-date.  Because medical research evolves very quickly, it is 
likely that government CPGs would fail to keep up with current medical 
research.  A 2001 study found thirteen out of seventeen CPGs developed by 
the AHRQ to be outdated.135 The study also found that it was estimated to 
cost $4 million per guideline to properly update them using the AHRQ’s 
Evidence Based Practice Center Program. 136  Unfortunately, medical 
research does not evolve on a rigid timetable, so agency guidelines may 
significantly lag behind cutting-edge medical advances.  There are, 
therefore, reasons to think government promulgation of CPGs may actually 
impede quality improvement.  
 In addition to quality problems, government authorship of 
guidelines could easily create greater cost-inefficiency in the health care 
system.  Various dynamics suggest that government agencies may create 
overly lax guidelines (or under-enforce them).137 First, agencies will often 
lack the resources to set the regulations efficiently (and as discussed above, 
                                                                                                                 
134  Revised Recommendations for HIV Testing of Adults, Adolescents, and 
Pregnant Women in Health-Care Settings, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (2006), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml 
/rr5514a1.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2014). 
135 Shekelle, supra note 61, at 1464. 
136 Id. at 1462. 
137 See Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional 
Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 494-95 (2008). 
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update them regularly).138 Second, as the history of the AHRQ revealed, 
agencies are vulnerable to the political preferences of the administration in 
power, to self-aggrandizing administrators, and interest group capture.139 A 
change in the government can lead to ossification of standards.  
Administrators operating in a revolving door environment may advance 
their post-agency careers by catering to interest groups that favor lax 
standards.  Most importantly, interest group capture can lead to under 
enforcement and, as in the case of the AHRQ, may hamstring guideline 
development or even cause the abandonment of CPG promulgation 
altogether. 140  Interest group capture can also lead to subtle biases and 
conflicts of interest in the guidelines that promote one company’s products 
or services over another’s at the expense of the patient. 
 At the same time, there are reasons why some federal agencies 
might adopt overly strict guidelines.  Occasionally, agencies regulate in 
response to crises, and this may lead to reactionary guidelines being 
promulgated.  Second, agencies lack the financial accountability necessary 
to incentivize efficient rulemaking.  Government agencies cannot be sued 
for making poor guidelines in a classic example of who watches the 
watchmen.141 As it is, an agency rule maker would be less likely to fully 
internalize the financial consequences of their own guidelines and may 
choose to overregulate.  Third, the overregulation may become even more 
exaggerated because, while the regulator may not be financially 
accountable, they will be politically accountable, which usually leads to 
more defensive policies.  If the agency errs by failing to regulate, its 
political accountability assures their punishment.  However, an agency can 
scarcely be punished politically for overly stringent regulations.142 More 
                                                                                                                 
138 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 571, 609 (1998). 
139  Interest group capture occurs when special interest groups gain a 
disproportional share of influence over a government agency. This can happen 
because of, for example, campaign donations or the revolving door between 
government and the private sector. 
140 See supra note 95 and accompanying text (describing how the AHRQ had 
to stop promulgating guidelines due to interest group pressure). 
141  In the US one cannot sue the FDA or any other agency for a wrong 
decision within their discretion. See 28 U.S.C. §2680(a) (2006) (imposing this 
exception to the general waiver of sovereign immunity created by the Federal Tort 
Claims Act). 
142 See Richard A. Epstein, Why the FDA Must Preempt Tort Litigation: A 
Critique of Chevron Deference and a Response to Richard Nagareda, J. Tort L., at 
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likely they will be commended for taking such a stern stance against 
liability prevention, but this does nothing to alleviate the economic 
pressures faced by the modern health care system.  
 Due to these countervailing considerations, there is uncertainty 
whether agencies would regulate in an overly strict or overly lax manner.  
The efficiency, however, would be diminished in either scenario.143 As a 
result the pure public model would probably do little to contain health care 
costs and might impair quality.  In sum, the chance that government 
promulgation of CPGs would directly improve the quality of care while 
being systematically and continuously efficient is slim.  
 
2. Certification of CPG Promulgators (UK Model) 
 
 While part of the UK Model involves the government 
promulgating CPGs, the part of the UK Model I want to focus on is when 
the government approves other entities that in turn create CPGs.  This 
certification process is done by the NHS Evidence Advisory Committee, 
created by the Board of NICE as an independent, standing committee.  The 
NHS Evidence Advisory Committee does not verify the efficacy of the 
individual guidelines, but chooses to focus on the methods used by 
guideline creators in guidelines production.144 These guidelines, along with 
others from accredited and non-accredited producers alike, are posted to the 
                                                                                                                 
22 (2006) (arguing agencies have incentives to regulate in an overly risk-adverse 
fashion because of self interest); see also Daniel P. Carpenter, The Political 
Economy of FDA Drug Review: Processing, Politics, and Lessons for Policy, 23 
HEALTH AFFAIRS 1, (2004). 
143  Most agencies seem to regulate only minimum standards of care. A 
possible exception is the FDA. See Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514 
(E.D. Pa. 2006) (acknowledging that the FDA seeks to encourage the optimal level 
of use in light of reasonable safety concerns, by requiring scientific evidence that 
establishes an association between a drug and a particular hazard before warning of 
that association on a drug's labeling). 
144  NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH AND CARE EXCELLENCE (NICE), PROCESS 
MANUAL FOR ACCREDITING PRODUCERS OF GUIDANCE, ADVICE, AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRACTICE: A GUIDE FOR PRODUCERS AND 
STAKEHOLDERS, available at http://www.evidence.nhs.uk/Accreditation/Document 
s/ NHSEvidenceAccredManual.pdf [hereinafter Accreditation Manual]. 
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committee’s website, NHS Evidence.145 Since 2009, NICE has accredited 
sixty organizations.146 Guidelines from these organizations are marked on 
the NICE website with a symbol indicating the approval from the 
government.  
How is the quality of care impacted by guidelines and guideline 
promulgation in the UK?  To try to understand the impact on health care 
costs and quality of the NICE accreditation system it is helpful to think 
about the themes of accountability, guideline agreement, and consistent use 
by doctors that an ideal CPG system would have.  Beginning with 
accountability, it is easy to see that a system focusing on process rather 
than output may have some issues.  Organizations that have been 
accredited are accountable to NICE for their processes, but not for the 
contents of the guideline.  If an organization creates a guideline that turns 
out to be incorrect, there is no liability that would hold that organization 
responsible for its recommendation.  There is also no promise that CPGs 
created by certified organizations will not be biased.  With no 
accountability, doctors would instead be on their own in defending their 
actions and would have less of an incentive to adopt CPGs. 
A second issue with the UK Model flows out of the lack of 
accountability.  Having a certification process that does not review 
individual guidelines or compare them to each other allows for the 
certification and publication of conflicting guidelines.  In the case of CPGs, 
more information is not always a good thing.  Conflicting CPGs, especially 
when both are stamped with government approval, may make doctors less 
likely to follow any guideline because they will not know which guideline 
actually represents the current best practices.  As we mentioned above, it is 
unrealistic for doctors to keep up with ongoing medical research given the 
enormous volume of studies and reports that are published each year.  
Synthesizing new studies and providing recommendations is one of the 
benefits of CPGs because they can reduce the information costs to doctors, 
especially those in solo practice.  When conflicting guidelines are certified, 
however, this benefit is largely lost and the implementation rate by doctors 
will likely drop. 
                                                                                                                 
145 Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH & CARE 
EXCELLENCE (NICE), http://www.nice.org.uk/aboutnice/accreditation/FAQs.jsp 
(last visited Feb. 11, 2014). 
146  NICE Accreditation, NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH & CARE EXCELLENCE 
(NICE), http://www.nice.org.uk/aboutnice/accreditation/index.jsp (last visited Feb. 
11, 2014). 
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Relatedly, a third issue with the UK Model is inconsistent use of 
guidelines by doctors.  This final and equally important issue with the UK 
Model is that it does not take full advantage of CPG’s potential to increase 
the quality of health care.  While having a system that certifies certain 
organizations that follow a specific process will improve the quality of 
guidelines, it will not achieve the same level of quality that could be 
achieved if, for example, the guideline producers were held accountable for 
the correctness of their guidelines.  If doctors are faced with a multitude of 
options, they may choose none since they will have reduced incentives to 
use CPGs and their trust in the system will have diminished.  If we assume 
that CPGs represent that best and most cost effective treatment for a 
disease, then when doctors do not follow CPG recommendations, the 
quality of health care drops. 
 
3. Certification of CPGs (Rosoff )  
 
Rosoff puts forth a CPG model where the government would stamp 
adequate guidelines with a seal of approval.  Rosoff is primarily interested 
in the role of CPGs in courts, yet he keeps one eye on the impact they have 
on the optimal delivery of care.147 Rosoff calls for a system of voluntary 
federal government certification for CPGs in order to clarify the role they 
play in medical malpractice litigation.  CPGs would continue to emanate 
from “all interested and qualified parties”148 as is currently the case.  Out of 
this free-market for guidelines, those that are submitted for review and 
satisfy the government’s criteria would receive a seal of approval.  
The government review process would focus primarily on 
guideline development.  The certification would require that the guideline 
be developed: 
 
(1) through solid, scientific outcomes research, using an 
appropriate and adequately large clinical practice data 
base; (2) using appropriate methodology, as defined by 
DHHS regulations; (3) with input from qualified medical 
professionals; and (4) with provision for prompt, 
periodic updating . . . . The applicant would pay both the 
                                                                                                                 
147 Rosoff, The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines, supra note 24, at 371. 
148 Id. at 395. 
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cost of the initial review process and subsequent 
updating or recertification.149  
 
As Rosoff acknowledges, difficulties would arise in 
implementation because, while certification would be a part of a national 
program, the litigation process it intends to affect mostly occurs in state 
courts.  Of course, any number of states could voluntarily accept the 
certification program via their legislatures.150  
                                                                                                                 
149 Id.  
150 For those states that do not join, Rosoff offers four mechanisms to force 
implementation. The first possibility is the commerce power.  Rosoff proposes that 
Congress preempt state law regarding medical litigation by use of the commerce 
power. Rosoff, Evidence-Based Medicine, supra note 77, at 364. He 
acknowledges, however, that such preemption would be problematic, as the object 
to be regulated in this instance is not commercial like health care or insurance, but 
the legal mechanisms usually reserved to the states. Indeed, a similar 
Congressional provision that preempted such state law, the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), received criticism. Id. Rosoff next proposes 
attaching the requirement of acceptance of the certification program to federal 
funding, an exercise of the spending power.  This would likely be a legitimate use 
of the spending power, provided the funding to which the program was tied was 
optional to the states. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). Similarly, 
Rosoff suggests attaching the CPG program to other federal health care programs. 
Citing the example of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act of 
1985 (EMTALA), he recommends tying his proposed use of CPGs to the Medicare 
and/or Medicaid programs. Rosoff, Evidence-Based Medicine, supra note 77, at 
365. Finally, there is the possibility of a less straightforward approach, which 
Rosoff describes as “an artful use of ‘carrot and stick’ mechanisms.” Id. 
Presumably, an act could be written that would incentivize adoption of the CPG 
certification program. Implicit in each of these possibilities (other than the use of 
the commerce power) is that states would still ultimately have the power to decide 
whether to join in the program.  As with all such scenarios, however, the incentives 
to accept the program could be structured to leave little for states to ponder.  The 
second and third possibilities are the spending power and attachment to other 
health care programs.  Citing the example of EMTALA, Rosoff recommends tying 
his proposed use of CPGs to the Medicare and/or Medicaid programs. Id. The last 
method he suggests is “the carrot and stick” approach. Id. He points to the National 
Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1975, which permits the 
granting of funding to states “on the basis of an established competitive review 
process” to be used for a variety of programs aimed at reducing the incidence and 
mortality rate of breast and cervical cancer.  42 U.S.C. § 300k (2006). 
320      CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL  Vol. 20.2 
 
Similar to the case with NICE, the stamp of approval for these 
guidelines focuses on the process by which the guidelines were created, not 
the properness of the actual CPG.  Yet, while NICE gave a stamp of 
approval for a guidelines developer, under Rosoff’s model the stamp of 
approval will be for each individual guideline.  
 Rosoff argues the certification program would increase the quality 
of care and also the quality of the guidelines themselves.  Increased 
reliance on CPGs would eliminate the guesswork of choosing between 
alternatives, which would result in faster, more effective treatment. 151 
Rosoff asserts that another benefit of his model would be the reduction of 
health care costs nationwide.  Because CPGs would have to be derived 
from evidence-based research, they would provide direction for medical 
professionals from a much larger cost-conscious perspective than such 
practitioners typically consider in treatment.152 Further, CPGs will typically 
recommend the most cost-effective treatment considered in light of its 
success rate and that of similar treatments.153 Finally, clinicians should be 
more inclined to follow the guidelines given the prospect of proposed 
liability shields.  Combined, these aspects of the Rosoff model should 
generally reduce costs.  
 Rosoff also envisions significant changes to the current medical 
malpractice regime by using CPGs to set the standard of care at trial and 
raising a presumption against negligence rebuttable only by “clear and 
convincing evidence.” 154  Rosoff intends to substantially reduce the 
expenditures associated with medical malpractice litigation.  The 
implementation of this proposal would reduce the actual need for litigation 
and those disputes that do reach litigation would be resolved in a less costly 
manner.  Using CPGs to set the standard of care would streamline one of 
the major questions present in malpractice cases.155  
                                                                                                                 
151 Rosoff, The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines, supra note 24, at 371. 
152 See id. at 372. 
153 Id. 
154 Rosoff, Evidence Based Medicine, supra note 77, at 361. It should be noted 
that the opposite application of the presumption is also true: noncompliance would 
raise the same, strong presumption of a breach. 
155  Id. at 363. Rosoff argues this conclusion must follow if doctors are 
permitted to use the guidelines in defending malpractice suits. Id. Though Rosoff 
brushes over the possibility of liability of developers in the current system, another 
commentator suggests that possibility is a very real one. See supra note 45 and 
accompanying text. 
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Putting aside issues with feasibility, 156  Rosoff’s model is 
problematic because there are doubts as to its ability to ensure CPGs meet 
the goals of improved healthcare quality and reduced costs.  To begin, the 
proposal itself ignores the problem of convergent guidelines recommending 
different treatments for the same conditions.  In fact, Rosoff seems to 
encourage this occurrence rather than deter it.157 While the problem may be 
resolved by the courts, it does nothing for medical professionals seeking 
evidence-based clarity.  Conflicting guidelines also likely means wasteful 
offensive and defensive medicine costs if the guidelines differ because solo 
practitioners, concerned about litigation, will not know ex ante if they will 
be protected by Rosoff’s proposed liability shield. 
 Looking closer at Rosoff’s proposal, the basic idea of a federal 
certifying agency poses special problems.  If the certification standards are 
too low, as some claim the NGC standards are, then the certification is 
essentially useless.  If, in contrast, the standards are too high, the agency 
will suffer criticism for being a government enforcer of only one “right 
way” to conduct medical practice.158 How to determine which standards are 
too stringent or which are too lax remains an open question.  For example, 
the National Guidelines Clearinghouse (NGC), supported by the AHRQ, 
                                                                                                                 
156 It is worth mentioning that even if Rosoff’s model was consistent with the 
goals set out at the beginning of this section, there may still be other issues with its 
implementation. First, the IOM’s endorsement notwithstanding, it would be 
difficult for the proposal to garner the political support necessary to push through 
Congress a certification program that impacts the courts in such a broad manner. 
Also, the sheer size of a federal agency such a system would require in order to 
address the volume of extant and newly produced guidelines would make the 
undertaking prohibitive. It would also be difficult to ensure the competence of the 
people certifying the guidelines in such a large agency. The roller-coaster ride of 
Obamacare is evidence enough of Congress’s reluctance to directly alter the health 
care delivery system. There would also be a constitutional question as to whether 
Congress could alter state medical malpractice rules to the extent of wholly 
extinguishing state law claims or providing an alternative federal remedy meeting 
Seventh Amendment standards.  See Abigail Moncrieff, Federalization Snowballs:  
The Need for National Action in Medical Malpractice Reform, 109 COLUM. L. 
REV. 844, 846-47 (2009). It is possible that courts could develop a more friendly 
view of CPGs, but as discussed above, this has not happened yet.   
157 See Rosoff, Evidence-Based Medicine, supra note 77, at 356. 
158 The same is not true for other countries such as the UK, where the health 
care system is structured differently than in the US and there is much more trust in 
the government and willingness to accept its mandates for medical care. 
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looks to “maintain a certain degree of quality control.” 159  The NGC’s 
criteria offer similar points of evaluation to those suggested by Rosoff.  
One criterion requires, for instance, that “a systematic literature search and 
review of existing scientific evidence published in peer reviewed journals 
[be] performed during the guideline development.”160 This is consistent 
with Rosoff’s criteria (1) and (2) above.161 For the NGC, a CPG must also 
be “produced under the auspices of medical specialty associations; relevant 
professional societies, public or private organizations, government agencies 
at the Federal, State or local level; or health care organizations or plans.”162 
This is consistent with Rosoff’s criterion (3).163 Moreover, the NGC does 
not review the guidelines themselves, but instead outsources that task to 
private entities.  Thus, but for this latter point it is not entirely clear how 
Rosoff’s model differs from the existing NGC model.  And higher 
standards cannot always be met.  Indeed, in a recent study it was found that 
the majority of guidelines sampled from the NGC website meet less than 
half of the IOM’s stricter requirements.164  
 The final problem with Rosoff’s model is that it suffers from the 
same lack of accountability found in the public model.  While there will be 
reputational incentives to promulgate accurate CPGs, this may not be 
enough to achieve the maximum result.  Without accountability, removing 
conflicts of interest is more difficult.  A recent study in the Journal of the 
American Medical Association supports this theory, finding that for the 
committees that produced guidelines appearing on the NGC website, 71% 
of the committee chairpersons had a conflict of interest and 91% of 
                                                                                                                 
159  See NATIONAL GUIDELINE CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.guideline.gov/ 
index.aspx (last visited Feb. 12, 2014). 
160 Inclusion Criteria, NATIONAL GUIDELINE CLEARINGHOUSE, www.guideline 
.gov/about/inclusion-criteria.aspx (last visited Feb. 18, 2014). 
161  “(1) through rigorous, scientific outcomes research, based upon an 
appropriate and adequately large set of clinical practice data; (2) using appropriate 
methodology, as defined by AHRQ regulations . . . .” Rosoff, Evidence-Based 
Medicine, supra note 77, at 360. 
162 NATIONAL GUIDELINE CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 160. NGC lists only 
the following types of qualifying organizations: medical specialty associations; 
relevant professional societies, public or private organizations, government 
agencies at the Federal, State, or local level; or health care organizations or plans. 
163  “(3) with input from qualified medical professionals . . . .” Rosoff, 
Evidence-Based Medicine, supra note 77, at 360. 
164 See Kung et al., supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
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committee co-chairpersons also had a conflict of interest.165 This is a huge 
problem, and will require a more comprehensive approach then that 
provided for by Rosoff. 
 The lack of accountability, conflicts of interest, and potential for 
conflicting guidelines that appear in the Rosoff model will likely lead to 
inconsistent use among physicians, especially those who are solo-
practitioners.  Doctors face their own set of incentives and costs when it 
comes to the care that they provide to patients, and the best model is one 
that will align these incentives with those of the guideline producer and the 
other healthcare players.   
 
B. THE SEMI-PUBLIC MODEL (IOM)  
 
 Rosoff rejects the possibility of private certification for CPGs in 
favor of a federal certification program.  Because an objective of his 
certification program is to assist judges in distinguishing reliable, valid 
guidelines from those that are not, he argues that private certification would 
lack the “official” certainty necessary to achieve that objective.  Courts, he 
continues, would be confused over the validity of conflicting guidelines if 
private certification reigned.166 Indeed, if one assumes that helping courts is 
the main goal of a certification program, as Rosoff does, a governmental 
system might make more sense.  
 But CPGs should do more than just help courts gauge the standard 
of care. CPGs should, above all, foster better delivery of care.  When 
viewed with this objective in mind, a private entity could implement the 
same criteria as Rosoff’s proposed government certifier.  This would allow 
the government to outsource its quality control to a private entity.167 I call 
this the Semi-Public Model and this is what the IOM recommended when it 
called for the establishment of a public–private mechanism to certify CPG 
development processes. 
                                                                                                                 
165 See id. at 1630. Other authors have discussed different ways that companies 
try to influence CPGs.  See, e.g., Marc A. Rodwin, Conflicts of Interest, 
Institutional Corruption, and Pharma: An Agenda for Reform, 40 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 511, 518 (2012) (“[F]irms fund physician and medical society activities to 
influence their clinical practice guidelines, which influences physician 
prescribing.”). 
166 Rosoff, Evidence-Based Medicine, supra note 77, at 357-58. 
167 The National Commission on Quality Assurance (NCQA) and the Joint 
Commission (JC) are examples of similar private certification programs. 
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 As was mentioned above, the IOM Report is based around eight 
standards that all CPGs should attempt to achieve compliance with.  These 
standards are process oriented such that they focus on the creation of the 
guideline rather than its contents.  Now is the time to review them more 
closely.  The IOM’s first requirement for CPGs is transparency, with a 
focus on ensuring that the way the guideline was developed and the source 
of its funding are easily accessible.168 Second, CPGs must be free from 
conflicts of interest.  To achieve this, the IOM Report calls for the 
disclosure of any and all COIs by guideline authors, the divestment of 
financial investments that could be affected by CPG recommendations, and 
the exclusion of authors with a COI whenever possible.169 The chair and 
co-chairs of the guideline committee especially should not have a COI.170 
Third, the guideline development group members should come 
from a variety of backgrounds including experts, clinicians, and patients.171 
This will help to ensure that all voices are heard during the process.  
Fourth, systematic review is the desired method for guideline drafting.172 
Fifth, and relatedly, the strength of the recommendation should be included 
in the guideline.173 This rating should include a description of the harms 
and benefits, also an explanation of the role that opinion and theory (as 
opposed to facts and systematic review of the evidence) played in the 
recommendation. 174  Sixth, the recommended action should be stated 
precisely so that it can be more easily understood and implemented by 
doctors.175 
Seventh, CPGs should undergo a process of external review from 
all the relevant health care players, including the public and the federal 
government. 176  These reviewers should be allowed to comment 
confidentially and the guideline authors should keep a record of why (or 
why not) they took the comments into account.177 Eighth, and lastly, CPGs 
should be regularly updated.  This includes monitoring the literature so that 
                                                                                                                 
168 2011 IOM Report, supra note 3, at 6. 
169 Id. at 7. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 7–8. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 8. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
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new evidence can be incorporated when it becomes known and the 
continued validity of the CPG can be ensured.178  
Given the similarities between this Semi-Public model and 
Rosoff’s and the UK models, it seems likely the same general effects would 
be observed and the same criticisms raised above will apply here as well.  
Well-defined development and evaluation criteria should elevate the 
quality of care, while financial incentives for developers should increase 
efficiency and reduce costs.  One important point of divergence, though, 
could be the role of CPGs in malpractice litigation under this model.  
Without government involvement, courts might still be reluctant to give 
weight to guidelines.  
 As discussed in the previous section, there is also the problem of 
conflicts of interest.  Although the standards may call for screening such 
guidelines out during the certification process, it has been shown that the 
vast majority of CPGs on the NGC website were created by a committee 
for which the chairperson or co-chairperson had a conflict of interest.179 
The Semi-Public Model also suffers from the same issues related to 
conflicting guidelines.180 All of these problems make CPGs certified under 
this model less helpful to doctors, and especially unhelpful to solo 
practitioners who have little time to review multiple guidelines for every 
procedure. 
 At their most basic level, CPGs should be trustworthy.  The IOM 
attempts to implement a system whereby trustworthy guidelines can be 
easily identified.  However, it has become clear that “[w]hile the IOM 
committee provided a comprehensive set of standards, it imposed an 
impractical definition of trustworthiness.” 181  By requiring adherence to 
eight standards, the system established by the IOM Report resulted in none 
of the current CPGs meeting the IOM’s definition of trustworthy.182 Not 
only do none of the existing CPGs meet, and perhaps can never meet, all 
eight standards, the majority of the CPGs in the NGC meet less than half of 
the IOM standards.183 While an unregulated system of CPGs does not help 
                                                                                                                 
178 Id. at 8–9. 
179 Id. 
180 See supra note 222 and accompanying text. 
181 David F. Ransohoff et al., How to Decide Whether a Clinical Practice 
Guideline is Trustworthy, 309 JAMA 139, 140 (Jan. 9, 2013). 
182 Id. 
183 See Kung et al., supra note 21, at 1629. 
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doctors, neither does a model where no guideline can be certified.  This is 
what is happening in practice with the Public and Semi-Public Models. 
 
C. THE PRIVATE MODEL (AVRAHAM) 
 
In a series of recent popular press articles and papers Avraham 
proposed a model for private regulation of CPGs.184 While it is still a new 
proposal in the field, it has received some attention in the literature. 185 In 
contrast to Rosoff, Avraham’s main goal is to use CPGs to achieve optimal 
                                                                                                                 
184  Avraham, Private Regulation, supra note 1 at 547; Avraham, Warped 
Incentives, supra note 1; Ronen Avraham, Private and Competitive Regulation of 
Medicine, 34 THE ECONOMISTS’ VOICE 546, 547 (2009); Ronen Avraham, A 
Market Solution for Malpractice (N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2011) available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/29/opinion/29Avraham.html?_r=1&ref=opinion; 
Ronen Avraham, Private Regulation of Medicine: A Win-Win-win For Doctors, 
Patients and Public, HUFFINGTON POST (July 22, 2009) http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/ronen-avraham/private-regulation-of-med_b_242937.html. 
185 See, e.g., Alex Stein, Toward A Theory of Medical Malpractice, 97 IOWA L. 
REV. 1201, 1245 n.248 (2012) (describing Avraham’s Private Model as “an 
insightful reform proposal”); Nathan S. Richards, Judicial Resolution of Emtala 
Screening Claims at Summary Judgment, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 591, 629 n.194 (2012) 
(noting Avraham’s proposal as “fascinating and novel”); Katharine A. Van Tassel, 
Blacklisted: The Constitutionality of the Federal System for Publishing Reports of 
“Bad” Doctors in the National Practitioner Data Bank, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2031, 2080 n.309 (2012) (citing Avraham’s model for CPG regulation as a way of 
enhancing quality of care while decreasing healthcare costs); Omri Ben-Shahar & 
Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard, 
111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 201 n.9 (2012) (citing Avraham’s model as a way to 
privatize the regulation of medical care); Jonathon H. Roth, Regulating Your 
Medical History Without Regulations: A Private Regulatory Framework to 
Electronic Health Record Adoption, 91 B.U. L. REV. 2103, 2122 (2011) 
(“Professor Ronen Avraham proposes a unique solution to rectify the inherent 
deficiencies in self-regulation: private regulation.”); Adam Candeub, Contract, 
Warranty, and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 46 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 45, 58 (2011) (arguing for warranties but admitting that “as medicine 
becomes more algorithmic, Avraham's position makes complete sense”); David A. 
Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice and Compensation in Global 
Perspective: How Does the U.S. Do It?, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 163, 172 (2012) 
(citing to Avraham’s proposal while discussing clinical practice guidelines); Nadia 
N. Sawicki, Patient Protection and Decision-Aid Quality: Regulatory and Tort 
Law Approaches, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 621, 635, n.75 (2012) (citing to Avraham’s op-
ed in the NY Times on private regulation). 
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care delivery.186 The role of CPGs in court proceedings is only one aspect 
of achieving this goal.  In contrast to the IOM proposal, Avraham’s model 
focuses on the guidelines themselves, and not on the procedures by which 
they were developed.  In contrast to the old US model and the current UK 
model, Avraham’s certifiers are not the government but the private market.  
The proposed regime purports to align society’s incentives in a socially and 
economically efficient manner, thereby improving the quality of care and 
reducing costs.187     
 In the most general terms, the Private Model would consist of 
private firms competing to provide evidence-based medical guidelines and 
to offer liability protection to complying providers.  Doctors, especially 
solo practitioners, would be (at least in the beginning) required to purchase 
guidelines from a provider in order to be licensed by the state or as a 
condition of participation in government health programs.  Because of the 
proposed “private regulatory-compliance defense” doctrine that is part of 
the model, CPG subscriptions fees under the Private Model would replace 
the medical malpractice insurance premiums that doctors currently pay.188 
As will be discussed, the price paid for CPGs should be lower than current 
medical malpractice insurance premiums because, assuming the doctor 
follows the guidelines, there will be no liability.  
 The Private Model achieves the triplet goals of improving the 
quality of care, increasing cost-efficiency and respecting patients’ 
preferences for the tradeoff between risk and coverage. 189  Free market 
                                                                                                                 
186 Michelle Mello also sees only a limited role for CPGs. She has argued that, 
given the current state of CPGs, they should not be used for inculpatory or 
exculpatory purposes. This is because CPGs did not generally represent the best 
practices in medicine. Mello instead advocated for expert’s use of CPGs to 
supplement their testimony. Given the advances in CPGs since the 2001 article was 
published, it could be that Mello’s views have changed. See generally Michelle M. 
Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in 
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 645 (2001). 
187  The contours of the proposal are laid out in full in Avraham, Private 
Regulation, supra note 1.   
188 If a doctor was concerned about potential liability that much being incurred 
by the failure to follow a guideline for a given procedure, he or she might obtain 
insurance coverage but since the chance of that happening should be very small the 
corresponding premium would also be very low. 
189 Under the current system a patient can have no insurance, insurance with a 
high deductible that does not cover every treatment, or a “Cadillac” health 
insurance plan that has a low deductible and covers every conceivable treatment 
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competition should keep costs low and legal liability for producing 
inadequate guidelines would force private firms to keep patient safety high.  
In order to attract customers (patients) seeking to minimize costs, private 
regulators would be forced to offer competitively priced guidelines without 
sacrificing quality or ease of use.  To achieve this, private regulators would 
have to discard unduly expensive or ineffective procedures.  Defensive 
medicine would not be an option.  At the same time, in contrast to current 
regimes in the US and the UK, and to the proposed regime by the IOM or 
Rosoff, patients would have a cause of action against the promulgating firm 
if the firm issued substandard guidelines that, directly or indirectly, caused 
injury to a patient.  The fear of liability may well cause firms to push 
medical standards higher, elevating the general quality of health care.  
 Unlike other models, accountability is one of the pillars of the 
Private Model.  This will ensure that the neutrality of CPGs is not a myth.  
Instead of a government agency that is subject only to administrative 
review of its rulemaking, the private firms would be held liable for 
damages caused by inefficient prescriptions.  Moreover, unlike an agency, 
a private firm could expect to legitimately profit from making safer, more 
efficient standards.  This proposal would also eliminate biased guidelines 
because they would be disciplined by market forces or legal liability.  As a 
result, the influence of other interested actors – namely drug and device 
manufacturers – would substantially decrease.  Lastly, unlike current 
medical practices a private firm’s profit margin would be closely aligned 
with patient safety, so these firms would have the financial incentive to 
invest in continuous improvement without relying on groups that have a 
conflict of interest.  At the same time, these firms would not feel so held 
hostage by the threat of litigation that they would advocate wasteful 
defensive medicine like unnecessary tests and procedures.  Outside 
influences from other actors in the healthcare industry can probably not be 
eliminated completely, but the introduction of market forces via the Private 
Model should cause conflicts to substantially decrease.190 
 The Private Model also successfully addresses the issue of 
inconsistent use.  Health care providers, especially solo practitioners, 
                                                                                                                 
option. Under the Private Model there would also be variations. One can imagine a 
tiered system with different levels of CPGs that patients can choose much like they 
select their health insurance plans today. This model would more directly reflect 
patients’ preferences regarding the cost and quality of care. For more on this, see 
Avraham, Private Regulation, supra note 1, at 631. 
190 Avraham, Private Regulation, supra note 1, at 584. 
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would be incentivized to use guidelines for two primary reasons.  First, 
reduction in bias would lead to better guidelines, allowing doctors to trust 
their recommendations.  The financial interests and professional 
responsibilities of providers would align, making it likely that they would 
utilize the techniques prescribed by the guidelines.  With hundreds of 
available CPGs, often with conflicting recommendations, doctors will 
benefit from having the guideline producer review, synthesize, and approve 
CPGs.  Through the Private Model doctors would not have to worry about 
multiple CPGs being certified for the same procedure.  As it stands now it 
is impossible for doctors to keep current with new guidelines because of 
their volume, something the guideline producer is better situated to deal 
with.  Second, if a doctor purchased the guidelines and followed them in 
treating patients, that person would be immune from malpractice liability.  
In other words, purchasing a CPG subscription from a firm would dilute the 
need for malpractice insurance, as long as the provider followed the 
guidelines.  The sum effect of increased reliance on better guidelines and 
decreased liability should reduce costs throughout the entire system.   
 To provide optimal incentives to putative private “regulators”, the 
legal infrastructure would have to have these five characteristics: (1) 
guideline evaluation from the ex ante perspective, (2) recognition of a new 
legal doctrine called the private regulatory-compliance defense, (3) 
provision of intellectual property protection for issued guidelines, (4) 
elimination of the state-of-the-art defense, and (5) imposition of solvency 
requirements on private firms producing guidelines.  It is possible that 
many of these will develop organically as healthcare players and judges 
recognize the benefits of such a system, but it is also possible that 
legislation would be required to fully implement this model.  The five 
characteristics are detailed below.  
 First, in order to properly incentivize private guideline producers, 
those firms must be exposed to legal liability for promulgating sub-optimal 
guidelines.  To create these optimal incentives, this liability must be judged 
in a courtroom from the ex ante perspective.  This would avoid hindsight 
bias and, importantly, it would take into account all potential beneficiaries, 
not just the specific plaintiff in a case.  Because firms know they could be 
subject to review at any time, they would be incentivized to develop 
efficient, impartial, and reliable guidelines.191   
                                                                                                                 
191 Without further protection, however, there would still be an incentive for 
overly safe guidelines. A simple way to deal with the problem is by using contracts 
between payers and providers that link reimbursements to the optimal level of 
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 Second, in order to incentivize providers to purchase and follow 
guidelines, a private regulatory compliance defense, essentially a safe-
harbor, would have to be added to the legal landscape.  This defense would 
be available to any doctor or hospital that purchased guidelines and then 
followed them, and private regulatory compliance with guidelines would 
have to be a complete defense.192 Third, it may be necessary to provide 
intellectual property (IP) protection for CPGs.  The concern is that, without 
protection, no private firm would have an incentive to develop CPGs.  The 
fear is that as soon as a guideline was published, other firms would free-
ride, thus making the production unprofitable. 193  Fourth, it would be 
necessary to eliminate the state-of-the-art defense.  Some states currently 
allow defendants to escape liability if their product or procedure was state-
of-the-art at the time it was originally made, even if research since that time 
has proven it to be dangerous.194 Under the Private Model, this defense 
would have to be eliminated in claims against the guideline producers in 
order to incentivize firms to continuously research better medical 
procedures and incorporate them into their guidelines.   
 Fifth, the solvency of the private firms promulgating guidelines 
would be necessary.  Otherwise, firms would have an incentive to 
                                                                                                                 
safety and cost-effectiveness. See Avraham, Private Regulation, supra note 1, at 
594. 
192 In order to maintain doctors’ discretion failure to comply with CPGs will 
not determine she was negligent – the physician still has the opportunity to 
convince the court that its deviation was clinically justified. (Granted, given the 
respect CPGs will get in court the task of convincing the court will not be an easy 
one.) Thus, CPGs serve as a “short sword” to distinguish from a regular sword 
because deviating from them does not determine liability, but only make it harder 
for the defendant to win the case. We do not find this asymmetry problematic on 
Equal Protection grounds at all. Patients are not a suspect class and there is no 
fundamental interest involved. The Equal Protection analysis would follow the 
traditional rational basis review standard. The rational basis is the legislature's 
interest in lowering health care costs and rewarding doctors that follow certain 
standards of care while enabling individualized care when needed. Moreover, 
counter-intuitively, the short-sword property of CPGs, benefits doctors because it 
is this property that conserves their autonomy to deviate from the guidelines. And 
doctors’ autonomy, as is well known, is extremely important to them. See 
Avraham, Private Regulation, supra note 1. 
193 See Avraham, Private Regulation, supra note 1. 
194 Traditionally limited to product liability cases, this defense has penetrated 
medical malpractice law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY §§ 1–2 (1998). 
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promulgate overly risky guidelines because they would know that the worst 
thing that could happen is bankruptcy.  The solvency guarantee could be 
obtained by requiring firms to have minimum assets or liability 
insurance.195 These requirements would mirror the solvency requirements 
currently in place for insurance companies.  As one can see, much of this 
reform could be accomplished with willing judges and/or private 
arrangements between relevant healthcare organizations. 
 While the multitude of changes needed to make this model work 
make it seem like more of a theoretical solution, entities in the medical 
field already operate under similar arrangements.  In the health care market, 
there are already private companies that create and market guidelines.  For 
example, McKesson is a company that provides CPGs as a part of its 
service package.196 These proprietary guidelines are not made publically 
available and McKesson has research staff that continuously reviews new 
literature and revises its recommendations as new information emerges.197 
Other companies providing similar services include UpToDate, 
FirstConsult, and Dynamed, several of which cater specifically to general 
practitioners. 198  Further, these CPGs are integrated with other software 
tools to improve workflow and cost efficiency.  This model is close to the 
Private Model proposal and provides hope that this system could be 
successful.  
 
V. CONCLUSION  
 
Putting effective CPGs in place is only one part of reforming the 
health care delivery system.  Major structural reorganizations of health care 
delivery are also necessary – particularly for specialty services and the 
management of complex patients with multiple chronic diseases – and will 
be accompanied by radical changes in payment policy (e.g., bundled 
payment) and a serious commitment to outcomes measurement.   
Still, process-based health policy tools such as CPGs will be very 
useful in the transition to an improved delivery system.  An effective 
                                                                                                                 
195 S. Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT’L REV. L. ECON. 45 (1986); 
Steven Shavell, Minimum Asset Requirements and Compulsory Liability Insurance 
as Solutions to the Judgment Proof Problem (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 10341, 2004). 
196 2011 IOM Report, supra note 3, at 41. 
197 Id. 
198 Avraham, Private Regulation, supra note 1, at 612–13. 
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governance structure and accountability mechanism for CPGs need not 
solve every information or incentive problem in the health care 
system.  But it must be broadly acceptable to physicians and the public, it 
must acknowledge the importance of cost-effectiveness as well as clinical 
effectiveness, and it must not become an independent power center that 
could end up working at cross-purposes to other goals and institutions that 
are critical components of health care reform. 
Clinical practice guidelines serve an important role in helping 
physicians who will remain in independent practice navigate the 
challenging waters of health care reform.  Going forward, CPGs should not 
be viewed primarily as a solution for problems with malpractice liability 
but as broader tools for quality improvement and cost reduction. 199 
Moreover, malpractice liability itself should be accepted only as part of the 
solution to problems that plague the promulgation and dissemination of 
CPGs.  Specifically, malpractice policies should be harnessed to help 
implement CPGs that can improve care.  
I argue that the exclusive reliance on public or semi-public models 
by the 2011 IOM Report is misplaced, and other alternatives, including 
private competitive regimes, should be considered as well, especially for 
solo practitioners.  Under the model selected by the IOM, issues with 
accountability and conflicts of interest in guideline production will 
continue to hinder the creation and widespread adoption of CPGs.  CPGs 
must be promulgated with assurances of both substantive and procedural 
integrity, disseminated to providers in an accessible manner, and used 
appropriately by consumers and payers in addition to courts.  This is likely 
to be true whether CPGs remain as standalone protocols or become 
embedded in other practice tools used by physicians in independent 
practice such as electronic medical decision aids, electronic health records 
with decision support, coding/billing software, and malpractice risk 
management guides.  It is also applicable to new models of primary care 
based on advanced practice nurses rather than physicians or using 
interdisciplinary teams that constitute “medical homes” for patients.  In the 
battle to reduce healthcare costs while improving patient care, CPGs are a 
powerful tool; but to be utilized to their full potential policymakers must 
                                                                                                                 
199 Of course there still remains a place for CPGs in malpractice reform. For 
example, the Obama administration’s $250 million package of grants to encourage 
states to overhaul their malpractice systems by, among other things, creating “safe 
harbor” laws based on CPGs may well prove beneficial. See Walker, supra note 
108. 
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keep an open mind and be willing to consider proposals that are outside the 
box. 
 
  
